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I. INTRODUCTION
Tensions between insurance companies and their policyholders
1
have significantly increased within the last fifteen years. When the
disputes resulting from these increasingly adversarial relationships
have been brought into the courts, juries have awarded policyholders
2
large verdicts. Today, an insurer that denies coverage does so at its
own financial risk. Even if an insurance company denies payment
because an apparently sound basis for a defense or a settlement
exists, a bad-faith judgment may nevertheless result if it is later
determined that the insurer’s denial was “wrongful.” If the insurer is
found to have acted in bad faith, it might pay a judgment in excess of
its policy limits to a third party, or pay to its insured the underlying
amount covered by the policy, including any emotional distress
damages suffered and, potentially, punitive damages.
Two decades ago, courts relied exclusively on substantive
3
contract law to resolve insurance policy disputes. Historically, there
was no differentiation between breaches of insurance contracts and
4
breaches of ordinary commercial contracts.
Where a wrongful
denial of policy benefits was established, the successful policyholder
5
was awarded the amount due under the policy, plus interest.
Damages for emotional distress or economic loss were not available

1

Douglas R. Richmond, An Overview of Insurance Bad Faith Law and Litigation, 25
SETON HALL L. REV. 74, 75 (1994).
2
Id.
3
See Randy Papetti, Note, The Insurer’s Duty of Good Faith in the Context of
Litigation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1931 (1992).
4
Id. Traditionally, breach of insurance contracts were treated the same as
breaches of ordinary commercial contracts. Policy holders who established a
wrongful denial of policy benefits would receive only the amount due on the policy,
plus interest. Phyllis Savage, Note, The Availability of Excess Damages for Wrongful
Refusal to Honor First Party Insurance Claims, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 164, 164-66 (1976).
However, in Braesch v. Union Insurance Co., 464 N.W.2d 769 (Neb. 1991), the court
explained the difference in the nature of the relationship that exists between the
insurance carrier and its insured from other consensual commercial relationships.
The court set forth three reasons for this difference: (1) the public status of
insurance contracts; (2) the non-commercial aspects of insurance contracts; and (3)
the inequality of bargaining power in the relationship between the insured and the
insurance company. Id. at 774-75. One commentator has described the primary
difference on “public interest” grounds, noting that insurance plays a pivotal role in
modern capitalistic society which demands public regulation and oversight. See
Roger C. Henderson, The Tort of Bad Faith in First-Party Insurance Transactions: Refining
the Standard of Culpability and Reformulating the Remedies by Statute, 26 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 1, 7-11 (1992).
5
Papetti, supra note 3, at 1931; see also Savage, supra note 4, at 164-66.
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6

under general contract law. Punitive damages were not available as a
7
deterrent.
Unlike standard contractual relationships which are entered into
at arm’s length, a special relationship exists regarding the purchase
of insurance due to the parties’ perceived unequal bargaining power
and the nature of insurance policies.
This relationship can,
potentially, allow unscrupulous insurance companies to exploit their
8
insureds’ misfortune by refusing to resolve or settle claims. In fact,
insurance policies are routinely characterized as contracts of
9
adhesion. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals made the following
observation:
When coverage and liability are established . . . a game of the
strong against the weak can begin. A claim known to be valid and
legitimate can be settled for far less than its actual value if the
need for funds by the victim is great enough and the insurance
company is obstinate enough to use its knowledge of that fact to

6

See, e.g., Dawkins v. Nat’l Liberty Life Ins. Co., 252 F. Supp. 800, 802-03 (D.S.C.
1966); Fletcher v. W. Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 92 (Ct. App. 1970); Savage,
supra note 4, at 167. Strident common-law principles of foreseeability limited
recovery to policy benefits. Terry B. Light, Note, Damages Assessed Against Insurers for
Wrongful Failure to Pay, 10 WM. & MARY L. REV. 466, 466-68 (1968). However,
commentators argued for a broader damages standard since the early 1970s. See
David Tartaglio, Note, The Expectation of Peace of Mind: A Basis for Recovery of Damages
for Mental Suffering Resulting from the Breach of First Party Insurance Contracts, 56 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1345, 1348 (1983) (arguing that “disruption of peace of mind” damages
should be awarded); see also Eric M. Holmes, Is There Life After Gilmore’s Death of
Contract? – Inductions from a Study of Commercial Good Faith in First-Party Insurance
Contracts, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 330, 339 (1980) (contending that insurance companies
are aware of the emotional protection policyholders contemplate).
7
Light, supra note 6, at 467; Savage, supra note 4, at 167-68. Allowing punitive
damages against insurance companies for bad conduct breaches of contract is an
exception to the general bar on extra-compensatory damages in contract law. See
Susan G. Gresham, Note, “Bad Faith Breach”: A New and Growing Concern for Financial
Institutions, 42 VAND. L. REV. 891, 892 n.5 (1989) (analyzing decisions from
jurisdictions that follow California courts in allowing tort recovery for bad-faith
breaches of insurance contracts). For a representative description of the cases where
damages were awarded for a denial of coverage based on specious pretexts, see
Roger C. Henderson, The Tort of Bad Faith in First-Party Insurance Transactions After Two
Decades, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 1153 (1995), discussing punitive damage liability triggered
by outright refusals to pay, delays, misinterpretation of records or policies for the
purpose of defeating coverage, using threats to force unfair settlements, and falsely
accusing the insured of wrongdoing. See also Richmond, supra note 1, at 74-76
(examining first-party and third-party bad-faith law).
8
See, e.g., Arnold v. Nat’l County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165, 167 (Tex.
1987).
9
See, e.g., Clemco Indus. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 665 F. Supp. 816, 818
(N.D. Cal. 1987), aff’d, 848 F.2d 1242 (9th Cir. 1988); Intermountain Gas Co. v.
Indus. Indem. Co., 868 P.2d 510, 513 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994).
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10

Because insurance policies are not purchased for commercial
11
advantage, but rather for protection against calamity, they are
unique contracts. When a covered loss occurs, the insured expects to
have the purchased protection. If the insurance company refuses or
fails to pay a valid claim without sufficient justification, the insured
may be put in a vulnerable economic position. In this situation,
contract damages may fail to provide adequate compensation for the
breach of security purchased through the insurance contract.
Moreover, limiting the insured only to contract damages may create
an incentive for insurance companies to deny claims before
performing an adequate evaluation of the claim. In Rawlings v.
12
Apodaca, the Arizona Supreme Court addressed the need for
deterring this type of conduct in the insurance context. According to
the Rawlings court, contract damages
offer no motivation whatsoever for the insurer not to breach. If
the only damages an insurer will have to pay upon a judgment of
breach are amounts that it would have owed under the policy plus
interest, it has every interest in retaining the money, earning the
higher rates of interest on the outside market, and hoping
eventually to force the insured into a settlement for less than the
13
policy amount.

Against this backdrop, courts created tort liability for an

10

Holmgren v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 976 F.2d 573, 578 (9th Cir. 1992)
(emphasis omitted). In State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Simmons, 857 S.W.2d 126, 136
(Tex. App. 1993), the court observed that the void created by the parties’ disparity of
bargaining power coupled with the insurance company’s exclusive control over
claims processing can be filled by imposition of the tort duty of good faith and fair
dealing.
11
Unlike traditional contractual relations, insureds purchase insurance policies
for peace of mind and security, rather than financial gain. Love v. Fire Ins. Exch.,
271 Cal. Rptr. 246, 252 (Ct. App. 1990) (“An insured does not enter an insurance
contract seeking profit, but instead seeks security and peace of mind through
protection against calamity.”); Ainsworth v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 763 P.2d 673,
676 (Nev. 1988) (“A consumer buys insurance for security, protection, and peace of
mind.”), reh’g denied, 774 P.2d 1003 (Nev.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 958 (1989).
12
726 P.2d 565 (Ariz. 1986).
13
Id. at 575 (quoting Wallis v. Superior Court, 207 Cal. Rptr. 123, 128 (Ct. App.
1984)); see Oki Am., Inc. v. Microtech Int’l, Inc., 872 F.2d 312, 315 (9th Cir. 1989)
(Kozinski, J., concurring) (“[The] tortification of contract law . . . gives rise to a new
form of entrepreneurship: investment in tort causes of action.”); White v. W. Title
Ins. Co., 710 P.2d 309, 312 n.2 (Cal. 1985) (Kaus, J., concurring and dissenting) (“It
seems to me that attorneys who handle policy claims against insurance companies
are no longer interested in collecting on those claims, but spend their wits and
energies trying to maneuver the insurers into committing acts which the insureds can
later trot out as evidence of bad faith.”).
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14

insurance company’s unreasonable denial of coverage. Although
limiting recovery to contract damages may create a motivation for
improper claim handling on the part of the insurance company, the
creation of tort liability for bad faith produces an equally dangerous
motivation.
Part II of this Article provides an overview of insurance bad-faith
principles. A foundational understanding of these principles will
assist the reader in evaluating the role of attorney-client
communications.
In Part III, the attorney-client privilege is discussed generally, as
well as specifically, in the context of insurer bad faith. In Part III.A., a
general overview of the attorney-client privilege is presented. In Part
III.B., commonly recognized exceptions to the attorney-client
privilege are discussed, as well as how those exceptions relate to badfaith insurance cases. In Part III.C., express and implied waivers of
the attorney-client privilege are discussed. The courts have disagreed
on the general contours of the test to be applied in determining
whether an implied waiver of the attorney-client privilege has
occurred, and what should be the precise formulation for that
determination. The courts have also disagreed as to when a client
may be deemed to have injected privileged attorney-client
communications into a case, causing an implied waiver. There are
three general approaches to determine whether a litigant has
impliedly waived the attorney-client privilege.
Each of these
approaches is discussed. In Part III.D., the Article discusses how the
direct assertion of the advice-of-counsel defense results in waiver of

14

Only a few remaining jurisdictions do not recognize first-party bad faith. As an
example, Michigan does not recognize an independent bad-faith tort against an
insurance company for an alleged breach of contract due to the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing. See Kewin v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 295 N.W.2d 50
(Mich. 1980); see also Roberts v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 374 N.W.2d 905, 909 (Mich.
1985); Ulrich v. Fed. Land Bank of St. Paul, 408 N.W.2d 910, 911 (Mich. Ct. App.
1991). Damages recoverable for breach of contract are those that arise naturally
from the breach or those that were in the contemplation of the parties at the time
the contract was made. Kewin, 295 N.W.2d at 53. However, an insurance company
does have an obligation to act in “good faith” in its resolution of claims. See
Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 393 N.W.2d 161 (Mich. 1986)
(establishing 12 factors to be considered in determining liability for third-party badfaith claims). Similarly, the courts of Minnesota do not recognize first-party bad
faith. See Morris v. Am. Mut. Ins. Co., 386 N.W.2d 233 (Minn. 1986); Haagenson v.
Nat’l Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co., 277 N.W.2d 648, 652 (Minn. 1979)
(“Minnesota . . . follows the traditional rule that bad faith breach of contract does
not convert the breach of contract into a tort.”). However, Minnesota does
recognize third-party bad faith. See, e.g., Short v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 334 N.W.2d 384
(Minn. 1993).
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the attorney-client privilege. The nature and scope of the advice-ofcounsel defense is explored.
In Part III.E., the changing boundaries of waiver by implication
are examined in light of three leading cases. The courts in Delaware,
Arizona, and Ohio have expanded the waiver-by-implication rule
substantially in recent years. As a result of this expansion, uncertainty
exists as to when a waiver by implication will occur in the context of
insurance company bad faith. This uncertainty may have a chilling
effect upon the advice that insurance companies seek from counsel.
The courts throughout the country have consistently held that an
insurance company’s mere denial of a bad-faith allegation is not
sufficient to waive attorney-client privilege. Recent cases suggest,
however, that an insurance company can lose the protection of the
attorney-client privilege simply because the opposing party raises an
issue to which advice of counsel may be relevant, including
allegations of bad faith.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF INSURANCE BAD-FAITH PRINCIPLES
As a concept, bad faith, like negligence, must be considered in a
15
specific context because it has no definite independent meaning.
16
The court in Wallbrook Insurance Co. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.
made the following insightful observation:
Insurers are required to act with good faith in dealings with
their insureds. The courts of this state recognize that the concept
of good faith possesses “an intangible and abstract quality with no
technical meaning.” One commentator sees the idea of good
faith as having “no definite meaning of its own,” but is commonly
illustrated in a negative fashion, “by explaining what it is not.”
Coming to the same conclusion, another observer notes that good
faith “is a phrase which has no general meaning or meanings of
its own, but which serves to exclude many heterogeneous forms of

15

See James C. Nielsen, Advice of Counsel in Insurance Bad Faith Litigation: A
Substantive Framework for Pleading, Discovery and Proof, 25 TORT & INS. L.J. 533, 534-35
(1990). Commentators have offered varying reviews of how many standards of bad
faith exist. For an analysis of how commentators have offered various opinions on
the standard to determine bad faith, see Lane Christine Boyarski, The Best Place,
Inc. v. Pan America Insurance Co.: Hawai’i Bad Faith Cause of Action for Insurer
Misconduct, 19 U. HAW. L. REV. 845, 853-54 (1997). For a description of the creation
of the tort of insurance company bad faith, see Henderson, supra note 4, at 22-26. See
also Thomas A. Diamond & Howard Foss, Proposed Standards for Evaluating When the
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Has Been Violated: A Framework for Resolving the
Mystery, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 585, 585-86 (1996) (describing the difficulty in determining
when the implied covenant of good faith had been violated).
16
7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 513 (Ct. App. 1992).
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bad faith. . . . In a particular context the phrase takes on specific
meaning, but usually this is only by way of contrast with the
specific form of bad faith actually or hypothetically ruled out.”
Looking to define bad faith is hardly less frustrating, for it too is
recognized as an “amorphous concept” which “necessarily varies
with the context” and thus has “no generally accepted ‘correct’
definition.”
As may be gathered, the issue of whether good faith was
exercised covers a broad range of territory. . . . [D]ecisions of the
Courts of Appeal have established that the litmus of good
faith/bad faith is to be tested against the background of the
totality of the circumstances in which the insurer’s disputed
17
actions occurred.

The tort of bad faith has been described as a hybrid cause of
action, sharing elements of both a negligence action and an
18
intentional tort. The tort is composed of two essential elements.
The first element—whether the insurance company acted reasonably
toward its insured—is based upon a simple, objective negligence
19
standard. The second element—whether the insurance company
20
acted knowingly —is a subjective determination. The introduction
17

Id. at 518.
Trus Joist Corp. v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 735 P.2d 125, 134 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1986).
19
The concept of bad faith requires more than negligence to support judgment
by the insurance company. Centennial Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 404 N.E.2d
759 (Ohio 1980). “It imports a dishonest purpose, more obliquity, conscious
wrongdoing, breach of a known duty through some ulterior motive or ill-will
partaking of the nature of fraud.” Id. at 762. The requirement of more than mere
negligence is supported by the holdings in many published decisions. See, e.g., Gen.
Star Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 960 F.2d 377, 380 (3rd Cir. 1992)
(interpreting New York law); White v. Cont’l Gen. Ins. Co., 831 F. Supp. 1545, 1555
(D. Wyo. 1993); Turner Constr. Co. v. First Indem. of Am. Ins. Co., 829 F. Supp. 752,
762-64 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Matt v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 798 F. Supp. 429, 434 (W.D. Ky.
1991), aff’d, 968 F.2d 1215 (6th Cir. 1992) (interpreting Kentucky law); Ins. Co. of N.
Am. v. Citizens Bank of Thomasville, 491 So. 2d 880, 882 (Ala. 1986); First Marine
Ins. Co. v. Booth, 876 S.W.2d 255, 257 (Ark. 1994); Dolan v. AID Ins. Co., 431
N.W.2d 790, 794 (Iowa 1988); Wittmer v. Jones, 864 S.W.2d 885, 890-92 (Ky. 1993);
Universal Life Ins. Co. v. Veasley, 610 So. 2d 290, 295 (Miss. 1992); Ganaway v.
Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 795 S.W.2d 554, 556 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); see also Mission Ins.
Co. v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 687 F. Supp. 249, 253 (E.D. La. 1988) (requiring
“something more than mere error of judgment” to show insurer bad faith).
However, a minority of states apply a negligence standard. See, e.g., Mock v. Mich.
Millers Mut. Ins. Co., 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 594, 607 (Ct. App. 1992); Ind. Ins. Co. v.
Plummer Power Mower & Tool Rental, Inc., 590 N.E.2d 1085, 1093 (Ind. Ct. App.
1992); Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 628 N.E.2d 14, 17 (Mass. 1994);
Gelinas v. Metro. Prop. & Liab. Ins. Co., 551 A.2d 962, 966 (N.H. 1988); Shamblin v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 396 S.E.2d 766, 776 (W. Va. 1990).
20
It is the unreasonableness of the insurance company’s conduct that is the
18
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of this second element of knowledge is what elevates the cause of
action to a quasi-intentional tort.
The first, negligence-based element of the tort acts as a
21
threshold test for bad-faith actions.
It is well established that
22
“[w]here an insurer acts reasonably, there can be no bad faith.”
The court in Trus Joist Corp. v. Safeco Insurance Co. of America gave an
excellent exposition of this concept:
[D]id the insurance company act in a manner consistent with the
way a reasonable insurer would be expected to act under the
circumstances[?] This is the threshold test for all bad faith
actions, whether first or third-party. Where an insurer acts
reasonably, there can be no bad faith. However, the converse of
this proposition is not necessarily true: merely because an insurer
acts unreasonably does not mean that it is guilty of bad faith.
Negligent conduct which results solely from honest mistake,
oversight, or carelessness does not necessarily create bad faith
liability even though it may be objectively unreasonable. Some
23
form of consciously unreasonable conduct is required.

Where an insurance company intentionally denies, fails to
process, or refuses to pay a claim without a reasonable basis for such
24
action, the tort of bad faith may arise. Insurance companies are
essence of the tort. See Tomaselli v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 433 (Ct.
App. 1994); Chester v. State Farm Ins. Co., 789 P.2d 534, 537 (Idaho Ct. App. 1990);
Alsobrook v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 852 P.2d 768, 770 (Okla. Ct. App. 1992).
The focus is upon the actual knowledge of the insurance company that its conduct
was unreasonable or whether the company should have known that it was acting
unreasonably. See, e.g., Galusha v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 844 F. Supp. 1401, 1404 (D.
Colo. 1994); Turner v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 614 So. 2d 1029, 1032 (Ala. 1993);
Ness v. W. Sec. Life Ins. Co., 851 P.2d 122, 125 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992); Brown v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 513 N.W.2d 762, 763 (Iowa 1994); Weatherly v. Blue Cross Blue
Shield Ins. Co., 513 N.W.2d 347, 354 (Neb. Ct. App. 1994); Transp. Ins. Co. v.
Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10, 18 (Tex. 1994).
21
Trus Joist, 735 P.2d at 134.
22
Id.
23
Id. (citation omitted). Thus, mere negligence or inadvertence is insufficient to
establish the cause of action. Rawlings v. Apodaca, 726 P.2d 565, 576 (Ariz. 1986).
The court in Rawlings observed:
Insurance companies, like other enterprises and all human beings, are
far from perfect. Papers get lost, telephone messages misplaced and
claims ignored because paper-work was misfiled or improperly
processed. Such isolated mischances may result in a claim being
unpaid or delayed. None of these mistakes will ordinarily constitute a
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, even
though the company may render itself liable for at least nominal
damages for breach of contract in failing to pay the claim.
Id. at 573.
24
Noble v. Nat’l Am. Life Ins. Co., 624 P.2d 866, 867 (Ariz. 1981); Anderson v.
Cont’l Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 368 (Wis. 1978).
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permitted, however, to challenge claims that are “fairly debatable.”
An examination of the circumstances surrounding the claim
26
presentation should be made. A claim is typically “fairly debatable”
where there remain unanswered material questions involving law or
fact that provide an explanation for the insurance company’s delay or
27
refusal to pay a claim.
The presence of a legitimate coverage
28
defense to a claim submission may preclude bad faith. Claims may
be denied on the basis of a “fairly debatable” policy interpretation,
25

Jordan v. Union Ins. Co., 771 F. Supp. 1031, 1033 (D.S.D. 1991) (stating that
insurer is entitled to challenge fairly debatable claims); Dirks v. Farm Bureau Mut.
Ins. Co., 465 N.W.2d 857, 861 (Iowa 1991) (same); see also Ward v. Fireman’s Fund
Ins. Cos., 731 P.2d 106 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986). Numerous courts have articulated a
“fairly debatable” standard in insurance bad-faith cases. See, e.g., Davis v. Cotton
States Mut. Ins. Co., 604 So. 2d 354, 358 (Ala. 1982); Deese v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 838 P.2d 1265, 1268 (Ariz. 1992); Garnett v. Transamerica Ins. Servs., 800
P.2d 656, 666 (Idaho 1990); Nassen v. Nat’l State Ins. Co., 494 N.W.2d 231, 236 (Iowa
1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1031 (1993); Pickett v. Lloyds of London, 621 A.2d 445,
453 (N.J. 1993); Tokles & Son, Inc. v. Midwestern Indem. Co., 605 N.E.2d 936, 943
(Ohio 1992); Bartlett v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 538 A.2d 997, 1000 (R.I.
1988); In re Certification of a Question of Law from the U.S. Dist. Court of S.D., W.
Div. (Champion v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co.), 399 N.W.2d 320, 324 (S.D. 1987);
Newhouse v. Citizens Sec. Mut. Ins. Co., 501 N.W.2d 1, 5-6 (Wis. 1993); First Wyo.
Bank, N.A. v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 860 P.2d 1094, 1101 (Wyo. 1993).
Courts have differed in defining and interpreting “fair debatability.” As an
example, the Alabama Supreme Court in National Savings Life Insurance Co. v. Dutton,
419 So. 2d 1357 (Ala. 1982), found that where there is a genuine issue of law with
respect to the insurance company’s denial of a claim, which precluded a directed
verdict for the insured, the insurance company was entitled to a directed verdict on
the issue of bad faith. However, the Dutton rule, which gave rise to the so-called
directed verdict test of bad faith, has been rejected by other courts. See, e.g., Bilden v.
United Equitable Ins. Co., 921 F.2d 822, 829 (8th Cir. 1990) (interpreting North
Dakota Law); Linthicum v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 723 P.2d 703, 711-12 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1985), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 723 P.2d 675 (Ariz. 1986).
26
Forcucci v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 11 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1993).
Courts have differed regarding the point in time that becomes relevant for
purposes of assessing whether the insurance company had reasonable grounds for
denying the claim. A significant number of courts have stated that they will only
consider evidence available to the insurance company at the time of the denial. See,
e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 505 So. 2d 1050, 1053 (Ala. 1987). However, some
courts inquire as to whether the insurance company had a fairly debatable reason for
denying the claim based on the facts presented at trial. See, e.g., Mass. Bay Ins. Co. v.
Hall, 395 S.E.2d 851, 857 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990). One commentator has opined that
insurance companies should not be permitted to meet the standards by putting forth
grounds recognized after the denial of a claim. See Chris M. Kallianos, Survey, Bad
Faith Refusal to Pay First-Party Insurance Claims: A Growing Recognition of Extra-Contract
Damages, 64 N.C. L. REV. 1421, 1435 (1986).
27
See Larson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 857 P.2d 263, 266 (Utah Ct. App.) (stating that
questions of law and fact can make a claim fairly debatable), cert. denied, 862 P.2d
1356 (Utah 1993).
28
First Dakota Nat’l Bank v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 2 F.3d 801, 811-12
(8th Cir. 1993).
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even though that interpretation ultimately may be rejected by the
29
30
courts. Insurance companies may litigate issues of first impression
by filing a declaratory judgment action without being exposed to bad
31
faith. If the insurer learns that the legal authority previously relied
upon does not continue to support its coverage position, however, it
may be required to change its position promptly and resolve the
32
claim.
Insurance companies cannot employ deceptive practices or
33
make deliberate misrepresentations to avoid paying claims. They
cannot deliberately misinterpret records or policy language to avoid
34
coverage. Instead, insurance companies must perform an adequate
investigation in determining the claim, or else risk bad-faith liability
35
arising from an improper claim denial.
They must avoid
36
unreasonable delay in resolving a claim. Insurance companies must
litigate the claim if litigation is required to resolve a coverage
37
dispute.
The linchpin of the tort of bad faith is the “covenant of good
29

See Mills v. Regent Ins. Co., 449 N.W.2d 294, 297 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989), review
denied, 451 N.W.2d 297 (Wis. 1990). Where open legal questions remain, an
insurance company may be insulated from bad faith. See Aceves v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
827 F. Supp. 1473, 1484 (S.D. Cal. 1993); Frost v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 828 S.W.2d
915, 920 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992); J.H. France Refractories Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 626
A.2d 502, 510 (Pa. 1993).
30
See, e.g., First Fin. Ins. Co. v. Rainey, 401 S.E.2d 490, 491-92 (Ga. 1991);
Armacost v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 644 P.2d 403, 405-06 (Kan. 1982);
Pressman v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 574 A.2d 757, 758-60 (R.I. 1990); Cuna Mut. Ins.
Soc’y v. Norman, 375 S.E.2d 724, 725-27 (Va. 1989).
31
Wierck v. Grinnel Mut. Reins. Co., 456 N.W.2d 191, 194 (Iowa 1990); Ballinger
v. Sec. Conn. Life Ins. Co., 862 P.2d 68, 70 (Okla. 1993). An insurance company is
not in bad faith for litigating an issue of first impression.
32
See, e.g., Harrington v. Guar. Nat’l Ins. Co., 628 So. 2d 323, 326-27 (Ala. 1993).
33
See, e.g., Indep. Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Peavy, 528 So. 2d 1112, 1114 (Miss.
1988); Banker’s Life & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 483 So. 2d 254, 270-73 (Miss. 1985),
aff’d, 486 U.S. 71 (1988); Timmons v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 653 P.2d 907, 910-11
(Okla. 1982); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Gros, 818 S.W.2d 908, 912-13 (Tex. App.
1991); Hampton v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 778 S.W.2d 476, 479 (Tex. App.
1989).
34
See, e.g., Hall v. Svea Mut. Ins. Co., 493 N.E.2d 1102, 1104-05 (Ill. App. Ct.
1986).
35
See, e.g., Standard Plan, Inc. v. Tucker, 582 So. 2d 1024, 1030-32 (Ala. 1991);
Morgan v. Golden Rule Ins. Co., 568 So. 2d 184, 188-89 (La. Ct. App. 1990); Indus.
Indem. Co. of the Northwest, Inc. v. Kallevig, 792 P.2d 520, 526-28 (Wash. 1990).
36
See, e.g., Filaski v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 734 P.2d 76, 83 (Ariz. 1987)
(noting that there were months of delay which included “such dilatory tactics as not
returning insured’s phone calls, ignoring her pleas for personal assistance in
completing forms, repeating requests which the insured had already complied with,
and rejecting her claims but providing no reason for doing so”).
37
See White v. W. Title Ins. Co., 710 P.2d 309, 316-17 (Cal. 1985).
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faith and fair dealing,” which is implied by law and imputed into all
38
insurance policies. The implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing is often expressed as a promise implied in all contracts “that
neither party will do anything which will injure the right of the other
39
to receive the benefits of the agreement.” A primary benefit flowing
from the insurance company’s express agreement to protect its
insured from covered calamities “is the insured’s expectation that his
insurance company will not wrongfully deprive him of the very
security for which he bargained or expose him to the catastrophe
40
from which he sought protection.”
A breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing can
occur notwithstanding the insurance company’s payment of full
41
policy benefits due on a particular claim. The focus of the inquiry is

38

See Kan. Bankers Sur. Co. v. Lynass, 920 F.2d 546, 548 (8th Cir. 1990); State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Weiford, 831 P.2d 1264, 1266 (Alaska 1992); Walter v.
Simmons, 818 P.2d 214, 223 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991); Pemberton v. Farmers Ins. Exch.,
858 P.2d 380, 382 (Nev. 1993); Pavia v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 626 N.E.2d
24, 27 (N.Y. 1993); Austin Co. v. Royal Ins. Co., 842 S.W.2d 608, 610 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1992). The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing can be traced back as far
as the late nineteenth century. See Germania Ins. Co. v. Redwig, 80 Ky. 223, 235
(1882); see also Brassil v. Md. Cas. Co., 104 N.E. 622, 624 (N.Y. 1914); Neal A.
Goldberg et al., Can the Puzzle Be Solved: Are Punitive Damages Awardable in New York for
First Party Bad Faith?, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 723, 727 (1993). The implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing is an outgrowth of society’s promotion of reliance on
contracts, and fairness and reasonableness in contractual relationships, which has
formed the public policy of a particular state. See Koehrer v. Superior Court, 226 Cal.
Rptr. 820, 828 (Ct. App. 1986).
39
Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198, 200 (Cal. 1958); see also
Wagonseller v. Scottsdale Mem’l Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1038 (Ariz. 1985).
A few courts have described the duties that an insurance company owes its
insured as those of a fiduciary. See, e.g., Frommoethelydo v. Fire Ins. Exch., 721 P.2d
41, 44 (Cal. 1986) (stating that because insurance companies hold themselves out as
such, they are fiduciaries); Bonke v. Mukwonago-Vernon Mut. Ins. Co., 329 N.W.2d
243, 248 (Wis. Ct. App. 1982) (declaring that insurance companies have “a fiduciary
duty to act on behalf of” their insureds as if their own interests were at stake). Other
courts, however, have characterized the relationship as confidential and have
imposed quasi-fiduciary duties on the insurance company. Typically, courts have
prescribed an obligation which describes the duty as “fiduciary in nature.” See
Hassard, Bonnington, Roger & Huber v. Home Ins. Co., 740 F. Supp. 789, 792 (S.D.
Cal. 1990) (“[T]he relationship between an insurer and an insured has many of the
elements of a fiduciary relationship, but is not an actual fiduciary relationship.”);
Love v. Fire Ins. Exch., 271 Cal. Rptr. 246, 251-52 (Ct. App. 1990) (stating that an
insurance company’s obligation is “akin to fiduciary-type responsibilities”); Tynes v.
Bankers Life Co., 730 P.2d 1115, 1125-26 (Mont. 1986). But see William T. Baker et
al., Is an Insurer a Fiduciary to Its Insureds?, 25 TORT & INS. L.J. 1, 1-2 (1989) (arguing
that insurance companies are not fiduciaries).
40
Rawlings, 726 P.2d at 571.
41
The Arizona Supreme Court has observed:
Failure to perform the express covenant to pay the claim is not the sine
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not whether a specific express provision of the insurance policy has
been breached by the insurer, but instead, whether the company’s
conduct damaged “the very protection or security which the insured
42
sought to gain by buying insurance.” When conduct is found to be
designed to deprive the policyholder of the benefits of the contract,
bad faith may exist, notwithstanding mere technical compliance with
the literal terms of the contract, because the remedies available may
43
be insufficient, undermining public policy.
Courts differ on
whether a breach of the covenant can be sustained in the absence of
44
specific coverage.
Insurance bad-faith actions are generally classified as either firstor third-party claims. This classification is based upon the type of
insurance coverage provided by the policy in question. Where the
insurance company contracts to pay benefits directly to the insured, a
first-party coverage situation arises. Examples of first-party coverage
include health and accident, life, disability, homeowner’s, fire, title,
and property damage insurance. In contrast, when the insurance

qua non for an action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing. To characterize the cases otherwise, would, in effect,
construe them to hold that any breach of the express covenant would
give rise to the tort action for bad faith. We hold explicitly that such a
result is not permitted. Not every breach of an express covenant in an
insurance contract is a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.
Id. at 573.
42
Id. Compare Paul E.B. Glad et al., Bad Faith Liability in the Absence of Coverage?, 7
BAD FAITH L. REP. 1 (1991) (arguing that no bad-faith liability can exist absent
coverage except in extraordinary cases), with Stephan S. Ashley, Bad Faith Liability in
the Absence of Coverage: A Response, 7 BAD FAITH L. REP. 6 (1991) (explaining that “the
law does not preclude bad faith in the absence of coverage”).
43
See, e.g., St. Benedict’s Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict’s Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 198-200
(Utah 1991). One court has observed that tort liability in this context requires more
than the intent to breach the contract or the intent to deprive the policyholder of
benefits. See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Noble Lowndes Int’l, Inc., 600 N.Y.S.2d 212,
214-15 (App. Div. 1993). Several jurisdictions have rejected tort-based remedies for
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. These jurisdictions
have allowed recovery of consequential economic damages for breach of contract by
the insurance company. See, e.g., Marquis v. Farm Family Mut. Ins. Co., 628 A.2d 644,
650-52 (Me. 1993); Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire Ins. Co., 392 A.2d 576, 579-81
(N.H. 1978); see also Olson v. Rugloski, 277 N.W.2d 385, 387-88 (Minn. 1979). Other
jurisdictions have substantially blurred the tort-contract distinction in the area of
consequential damages. See, e.g., Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 F.2d 951, 957
(7th Cir.), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1017 (1982).
44
Compare Harbor Ins. Co. v. Urban Constr. Co., 990 F.2d 195, 202 (5th Cir.
1993) (holding that absence of coverage, alone, did not preclude recovery for breach
of the implied covenant), with McMillan Scripts N. P’ship v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 23
Cal. Rptr. 2d 243, 247 (Ct. App. 1993) (holding that where no loss covered by policy
occurred, there was no breach of the implied covenant).
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company contracts to indemnify the insured against liability to third
parties, a third-party coverage situation exists. The type of claim is
not determined by the identity of the party bringing the bad-faith
action against the insurance company. For example, a third-party
action might be brought by the insured in the event that he or she is
subjected to excess liability by reason of the insurance company’s
bad-faith refusal to settle. In that event, the standards applicable to
third-party claims would govern the action, although it was brought
by the insured, rather than a third-party assignee.
Both first- and third-party bad-faith claims derive from the same
duty—the duty of good faith and fair dealing. The two actions,
however, involve different factual circumstances and distinct
considerations for the insurance company. Ordinarily, a first-party
claim involves a coverage dispute between the insurance company
and its insured. In this situation the insurance company must not act
in bad faith to thwart the insured’s reasonable expectations for
coverage under the policy. First-party claims do not involve the
insurance company in defending a legal action brought by a third
party that could result in financial ruin of the insured.
A third-party claim, by comparison, includes the additional risk
of subjecting the insured to liability in excess of the policy limits
because of the insurance company’s bad-faith refusal to settle within
those limits.
Typically, the insurance company has exclusive
authority to accept or reject settlement offers and takes on the
45
additional responsibility of defending the claim. The duty to accept
reasonable settlements in third-party situations and the duty not to
withhold payment of first-party claims “are merely two different
46
aspects of the same duty.”
Because the risk to the insured and the responsibilities of the
45

Kallianos, supra note 26, at 1429. The differences between first-party and thirdparty coverage are significant enough that some jurisdictions refuse to recognize
first-party actions while allowing third-party actions. See, e.g., Spencer v. Aetna Life &
Cas. Ins. Co., 611 P.2d 149, 155-58 (Kan. 1980); Lawton, 392 A.2d at 580-81. The
Supreme Court of New Hampshire noted:
The dilemma presented by the absolute control of trial and settlement
vested in the insurer by the insurance contract and the conflicting
interests of the insurer and insured in the third-party claim requires
that the insurer recognize the conflict and give due regard to the
interest of the insured. This dilemma is lacking in the first-party claim.
The insurer is not in a position to expose the insured to a judgment in
excess of the policy limits through its unreasonable refusal to settle a
case, nor is it in a position to otherwise injure the insured by virtue of
its exclusive control over the defense of the case.
Id. at 581 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
46
Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032, 1037 (Cal. 1973).
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insurance company are distinguishable in first- and third-party claims,
the applicable standard of conduct is necessarily different. In the
first-party situation, the insurance company breaches the implied
duty of good faith and fair dealing if it (1) acts unreasonably towards
its insured, and (2) acts knowingly or with reckless disregard as to the
reasonableness of its actions. Under this standard, an insurance
company can challenge a claim that is “fairly debatable.” In thirdparty cases, determining whether the insurance company has acted in
bad faith by refusing to settle a claim brought by a third party
requires an equal consideration of the comparative hazards. This
standard of reasonableness requires that the insurance company
47
consider various factors, one of which is the relative strength of the
claim by the third party against the insured.
Although the
debatability of the claim may be an issue as to liability and damages, it
is not determinative. The insurance company must also weigh other
considerations, such as the financial risk to the insured in the event
48
of a judgment in excess of the policy limits.
The test for
determining whether the insurer has appropriately considered the
interests of the insured is “whether a prudent insurer without policy
49
limits would have accepted the settlement offer.”
In third-party
situations, the insured bears a disproportionate share of the risk if the
insurance company, in exercising its exclusive control over
settlement, fails to accept a reasonable settlement offer within policy
limits. The insured faces personal liability for an award exceeding
the policy limits, while the insurance company’s potential liability
50
remains constant—it cannot exceed the policy limits.
47

The Arizona Supreme Court, in General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v.
Little, 443 P.2d 690 (Ariz. 1968), delineated several factors to be considered by the
court in assessing whether the insurance company has treated the insured’s interest
with an equality of consideration:
[1] the strength of the injured claimant’s case on the issues of liability
and damages; [2] attempts by the insurer to induce the insured to
contribute to a settlement; [3] failure of the insurer to properly
investigate the circumstances so as to ascertain the evidence against the
insured; [4] the insurer’s rejection of advice of its own attorney or
agent; [5] failure of the insurer to inform the insured of a compromise
offer; [6] [t]he amount of financial risk to which each party is exposed
in the event of a refusal to settle; [7] the fault of the insured in
inducing the insurer’s rejection of the compromise offer by misleading
it as to the facts; and [8] any other factors tending to establish or
negate bad faith on the part of the insurer.
Id. at 694 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Brown v. Guar. Ins. Co., 319
P.2d 69, 75 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958)).
48
Id.
49
Crisci v. Sec. Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173, 176 (Cal. 1967).
50
The court in In re Allstate Insurance Co., 722 S.W.2d 947 (Mo. 1987), has
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III. ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND INSURER BAD FAITH
A. General Overview of the Privilege
The attorney-client privilege protects communications between
51
the attorney and the client.
The purpose of the attorney-client

delineated the context in which litigation decisions are made and how these create a
vulnerability with regard to the insured:
The insurer has the contract right to direct the litigation. . . . It may
evaluate claims and decide whether to settle. . . . It may make economic
decisions without the assent of the insured. The insured may want a
quick settlement to eliminate further demands on time and energy, but
the insurer does not have to settle unless a satisfactory offer is
forthcoming. Or the insurer may accept a settlement offer even though
the insured wants to go to trial to establish freedom from fault. The
insurer may decide what to spend in defense, what discovery is to be
had, and what experts to hire. It also has the right to select counsel to
defend its interests.
Id. at 952. The vulnerability of the insured which arises through the insurance
company’s control of the defense is exemplified by several cases. See, e.g., Betts v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 528, 546 (Ct. App. 1984) (noting that insurance
company’s appointed defense attorney took advantage of the insured by “actively
working to protect [the insurance company] and persisting in manipulating [the
insured] against her own best interests”); Rosenzweig v. Blimshteyn, 544 N.Y.S.2d
865, 867 (App. Div. 1989) (defense counsel appointed by the insurance carrier
adopted a defense to avoid the payment of any monies by the insurance company,
regardless of the consequences to the insureds who were his “ostensible clients”).
51
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). The traditional
elements of the attorney-client privilege that identify communications that may be
protected from disclosure and discovery are:
(1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client;
(2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is a member
of the bar or a court, or his or her subordinate, and (b) in connection
with this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication
relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by his client,
(b) without the presence of strangers, (c) for the purpose of securing
primarily either (i) an opinion of law or (ii) legal services or (iii)
assistance in some legal proceeding, and (d) not for the purpose of
committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed
and (b) not waived by the client.
In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1233 (3d Cir. 1979) (citing United
States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass. 1950)). The
attorney-client privilege has been extended to third-party agents of a client or its
counsel under certain circumstances. See, e.g., United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918,
922 (2d Cir. 1961). Under Kovel, “voluntarily disclosing the information contained
in the [privileged] documents to nonparties waives the attorney-client privilege,
unless such disclosure was ‘necessary, or at least highly useful, for the effective
consultation between the client and the lawyer which the privilege is designed to
permit.’” Strougo v. BEA Assocs., 199 F.R.D. 515, 522 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (quoting Kovel,
296 F.2d at 922). Based on these principles, courts following Kovel have applied a
two-step analysis in evaluating whether the attorney-client privilege should be
extended to third-party agents. This analysis focuses upon: (1) whether the inclusion
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privilege is to promote “full and frank communication between
52
attorneys and their clients.” There are two broad justifications that
underlie the privilege. The first justification is that the privilege
promotes disclosure of all relevant information by the client to
enable the attorney to effectively represent the client or to give
53
adequate legal advice. Without the privilege it is presumed that
many clients would not communicate all relevant information to the
attorney if adverse parties could use it against them in subsequent
litigation. The second justification is that an attorney must be able to
openly communicate legal advice and strategies to the client in order
to adequately represent him or her, and that the attorney would not
engage in such communications if adverse litigants could discover
54
them in subsequent litigation.
Because “sound legal advice or
55
advocacy serves public ends,” the privilege is necessary to promote

of the third-party agent in the otherwise privileged communications occurs under
circumstances reflecting the parties’ reasonable expectation that the confidentiality
of the communications will be maintained, and (2) whether disclosure of the
otherwise privileged communications to the third-party agent is necessary in order
for the client to obtain appropriately informed legal advice. See generally United
States v. Ackert, 169 F.3d 136, 139-40 (2d Cir. 1999); Constr. Indus. Servs. Corp. v.
Hanover Ins. Co., 206 F.R.D. 43, 47-48 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); In re Pfohl Bros. Landfill
Litig., 175 F.R.D. 13, 23-24 (W.D.N.Y. 1997); People v. Osorio, 549 N.E.2d 1183,
1185-86 (N.Y. 1989); Doe v. Poe, 664 N.Y.S.2d 120, 122 (N.Y. 1989). In extending the
scope of the privilege, implicitly or explicitly, the courts have found the disclosure of
the otherwise privileged communications to the third-party agent to be “necessary” to
the client’s ability to seek and receive effective legal advice from counsel, and have
found that the third-party agent was essentially fulfilling a role functionally
equivalent to that of an integral employee of the client. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n
v. GlaxoSmithKline, 294 F.3d 141, 147-48 (D.C. Cir. 2002); In re Bieter Co., 16 F.3d
929, 938 (8th Cir. 1997); In re Copper Mkt. Antitrust Litig., 200 F.R.D. 213, 215, 219
(S.D.N.Y. 2001).
52
Upjohn, 499 U.S. at 389.
53
Id. (citing Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980)).
54
Id.
55
Id. Despite the beneficial nature of the attorney-client privilege, some courts
have adopted a strict interpretation to limit its scope. See, e.g., Cameron v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 158 F.R.D. 581, 586 (D.S.C. 1994), vacated in part on other grounds sub
nom. In re Gen. Motors Corp., Case No. 94-2435, 1995 WL 940063 (4th Cir. Feb. 17,
1995). In Cameron, a non-insurance case, the district court recognized the limited
nature of the attorney-client privilege and the strict construction and limitations
governing its application: “Because the attorney-client privilege is an exception from
the otherwise liberal construction of discovery rules, its use is not favored by federal
courts. Therefore, assertions of attorney-client privilege are to be strictly confined
within the narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of its principal.”
Cameron, 158 F.R.D. at 586 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also
Grand Jury Proceedings Under Seal v. United States, 947 F.2d 1188, 1190 (4th Cir.
1991) (“[T]he [attorney-client] privilege must be narrowly construed.”); United
States v. Tedder, 801 F.2d 1437, 1441 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 938
(1987); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d at 1235; NLRB v. Harvey, 349 F.2d 900,
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full and unrestricted communication within the attorney-client
relationship.
Courts must work to apply the privilege in ways that are
predictable and certain in order to serve the interests of justice by
encouraging consultation with counsel free from the apprehension of
disclosure. “An uncertain privilege—or one which purports to be
certain, but results in widely varying applications by the courts—is
56
little better than no privilege.”
Thus, uncertainty regarding the
scope of the attorney-client privilege may have an adverse impact. If
uncertainty remains, attorneys and their clients will be forced to
assume that private communications will be subject to discovery,
57
essentially eliminating the privilege.

906 (4th Cir. 1965).
Evidentiary privileges are an exception to the general rule that relevant evidence
is admissible. Privileges forbid the admission of otherwise relevant evidence when
certain interests the privileges are thought to protect are regarded as more
important than the interests served by the resolution of litigation based on full
disclosure of all relevant facts. However, the privilege forbidding the discovery of
admission of evidence relating to communications between attorney and client is
intended to insure that a client remains free from apprehension that consultations
with a legal advisor will be disclosed. See Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470
(1888). The attorney-client privilege encourages the client to reveal to the lawyer
confidences necessary for the lawyer to provide advice and representation. See
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 87, at 205 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984) (stating
that lawyers “can act effectively only if they are fully advised of the facts by the parties
whom they represent”). Because the privilege serves the interests of justice, courts
have observed that it is worthy of maximum protection. Haines v. Liggett Group,
Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 90 (3d Cir. 1992). Courts and commentators have supported the
privilege:
As long as our society recognizes that advice as to matters relating to
the law should be given by persons trained in the law – that is, by
lawyers – anything that materially interferes with that relationship must
be restricted or eliminated, and anything that fosters the success of that
relationship must be retained and strengthened. The relationship and
the continued existence of the giving of legal advice by persons
accurately and effectively trained in the law is of greater societal value,
it is submitted, than the admissibility of a given piece of evidence in a
particular lawsuit. Contrary to the implied assertions of the evidence
authorities, the heavens will not fall if all relevant and competent
evidence cannot be admitted.
State ex rel. Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 574 S.W.2d 379, 383 (Mo. 1978) (quoting
Robert Allen Sedler & Joseph J. Simeone, Privileges in the Law of Evidence: The Realities
of Attorney-Client Confidences, 24 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 3 (1963)).
56
In re Von Bulow, 828 F.2d 94, 100 (2d Cir. 1987).
57
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Lee, 13 P.3d 1169, 1187 (Ariz. 2000)
(McGregor, J., dissenting).
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B. Commonly Recognized Exceptions to the Privilege and Their
Application to Bad-Faith Cases
There are three principal exceptions to the attorney-client
58
privilege. The first exception pertains to crimes and fraud. Here,
the attorney-client privilege is vitiated when the client seeks the
59
services of the lawyer to commit a crime or fraud.
Courts have
generally found that mere allegations of insurance company bad faith
60
do not give rise to the crimes or fraud exception. As an example, in

58

This exception addresses the perpetuation of crimes or other evil enterprises
that are pursued by a client in concert with his attorney. See, e.g., United Servs. Auto.
Ass’n. v. Werley, 526 P.2d 28, 31 (Alaska 1974). Upon a prima facie showing of fraud,
the attorney-client privilege is defeated. Id. at 32. “Although the fraud or crime
must have been contemplated by the client at the time of the communication, it is
irrelevant whether the attorney was aware of the client’s purpose.” Munn v. Bristol
Day Hous. Auth., 777 P.2d 188, 195 (Alaska 1989) (citations omitted); see also In re
Grand Jury Proceedings, 183 F.3d 71, 75-76 (1st Cir. 1999) (explaining that attorneyclient privilege is vitiated when the client seeks the services of the lawyer and uses the
lawyer to commit a crime or a fraud). The attorney need not be aware of the client’s
fraud for the exception to apply. Caldwell v. Dist. Court, 644 P.2d 26, 33-34 (Colo.
1982).
Some jurisdictions have codified the crime or fraud exception. See, e.g., OR.
EVID. CODE § 503(4)(a) (2003) (providing that attorney-client privilege does not
apply “[i]f the services of the lawyer were sought or obtained to enable or aid anyone
to commit or plan to commit what the client knew or reasonably should have known
to be a crime or fraud”). Kansas, like Oregon, has also codified the exception. See
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-426(d)(1) (2003). In Kansas the exception applies where
communications for legal services are sought in order to enable or aid in the
commission or planning of the commission of a crime or tort. See Fairport Int’l
Exploration, Inc. v. Shipwrecked Vessel, 177 F.3d 491, 501 (D. Kan. 1997); see also
United States v. Anderson, 85 F. Supp. 2d 1047 (D. Kan. 1999).
59
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 183 F.3d at 75-76.
60
Cf. Freedom Trust v. Chubb Group of Ins. Cos., 38 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1174
(C.D. Cal. 1999) (applying California law) (stating that exception was not triggered
merely upon a prima facie showing of bad faith); Gagne v. Ralph Pill Elec. Supply Co.,
114 F.R.D. 22, 25 (D. Me. 1987) (holding that a person seeking discovery in bad-faith
case must present prima facie evidence of fraud before materials sought will become
discoverable pursuant to the crime or fraud exception); Riggs v. Schroering, 822
S.W.2d 414, 415 (Ky. 1991) (finding attorney-client privilege not breached by mere
allegation of bad faith); Levin v. C.O.M.B. Co., 469 N.W.2d 512, 515 (Minn. Ct. App.
1991) (while recognizing the crime or fraud exception, noting that “[m]ere
allegations of wrongdoing are insufficient to warrant application of the exception”).
A significant number of courts in bad-faith actions have found that once a prima
facia case or bad-faith refusal to pay has been established, the attorney-client privilege
between an insurance company and its attorneys is abrogated. See Silva v. Fire Ins.
Exch., 112 F.R.D. 699, 700 (D. Mont. 1996); In re Bergeson, 112 F.R.D 692, 697-98
(D. Mont. 1986); Escalante v. Sentry Ins. Co., 743 P.2d 832, 842-43 (Wash. Ct. App.
1987). The court in Werley, 526 P.2d 28, held that where the attorney is involved in a
bad-faith attempt to defeat or reduce coverage, the invocation of the attorney-client
privilege in such bad-faith dealings would be inappropriate. Id. at 33. Such conduct
constitutes “civil fraud.” Id. See generally BARRY R. OSTRAGER & THOMAS R. NEWMAN,
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61

Guaranty National Insurance Co. v. George, the insured sought the
production of an opinion letter written by counsel for the insurance
company. The Kentucky Court of Appeals concluded that the
opinion letter was protected by the attorney-client privilege and was,
therefore, not discoverable “in the absence of any evidence indicating
the contemplation of a tortious act on behalf of [the insurance
62
company].” The court stated, “To develop an exception in bad faith
cases against insurers would impede the free flow of information and
honest evaluation of claims. In the absence of fraud or criminal
activity, an insurer is entitled to the attorney-client privilege to the
63
same extent as other litigants.”
The Washington Court of Appeals, in Escalante v. Sentry Insurance
64
Co., provided some further guidance in this area. In cases of alleged
insurer bad faith, the court held that the attorney-client privilege
does not apply when the documents sought to be protected “pertain
65
to ongoing or future fraudulent conduct by the insurer.”
In
extending the civil fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege to
cases implicating insurance company misconduct, the court in
Escalante established a two-part test to determine whether fraudulent
conduct by the insurance company occurred, and whether that
66
conduct was sufficient to overcome the privilege. First, the trial
court must determine whether there was “a factual showing adequate
to support a good faith belief by a reasonable person that wrongful
conduct sufficient to invoke the . . . fraud exception . . . has
67
occurred.”
Second, if the trial court finds the requisite factual
showing has been made, the requested documents are subjected to
an in camera inspection, at the trial court’s discretion, to determine
whether there is a “foundation in fact” to overcome the privilege

HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES § 10.11 (4th ed. 1991).
61
953 S.W.2d 946 (Ky. 1997).
62
Id. at 948.
63
Id. (quoting the Kentucky Court of Appeals); see also State ex rel. United States
Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Mont. Secondary Judicial Court, 783 P.2d 911, 916 (Mont. 1989)
(“An insurance company must have an honest and candid evaluation of the case,
possibly including a ‘worse case scenario.’ A concern by the attorney that
communications would be discoverable in a [third-party] bad faith suit would
certainly chill open and honest communication . . . . It could also impede
settlements.”).
64
743 P.2d 832 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987), review denied, 109 Wash. 2d 1025 (1988).
65
Id. at 842.
66
Id. at 843.
67
Id. at 842-43 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Caldwell, 644 P.2d at
33).
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based upon civil fraud.
The second exception to the attorney-client privilege
encompasses the legal capacity doctrine: the nature of the work

68

Escalante, 743 P.2d at 842. The Escalante civil fraud exception test was applied
by the court in Barry v. USAA, 989 P.2d 1172, 1176 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999). After the
tortfeasor’s automobile liability insurance company paid its policy limits, the insured
sought underinsured motorist benefits under her own policy. The insured hired her
own attorney to pursue the claim. Following several months of delay in the
processing of the claim, the insured filed an action against the insurer alleging bad
faith and consumer protection violations. The insured sought discovery of reports
from the claims adjuster and correspondence from the insurance company’s
attorney who handled the underinsured motorist claim. Id. at 1174. The court
applied the two-part test set out in Escalante. First, the trial court in Barry reviewed
the case file and found that the insured had failed to establish sufficient wrongful
conduct to invoke the civil fraud exception. The trial court therefore refused to
exercise its discretionary right to inspect the privileged documents in camera. On
appeal the trial court’s decision was affirmed. The appellate court could not
conclude that the trial court’s exercise of discretion was “manifestly unreasonable or
based on untenable grounds.” Id. at 1177.
The Escalante test was recently questioned by an unpublished decision of the
Washington Court of Appeals. In In re Azula, No. 46314-4-I, 2001 Wash. App. LEXIS
219 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 5, 2001), the court held that an in camera review of relevant
documents is mandatory where disclosure of evidence is opposed on the basis of a
privilege, insisting that such review “is the only way a court can determine whether a
document is exempt from disclosure or sufficiently relevant to even merit
disclosure.” Id. at *3. The Azula court noted that Barry and Escalante, which allowed
discretionary review in such situations, are “inconsistent with Washington Supreme
Court holdings, resulting from their mistaken reliance on Colorado law.” Id. at *3
n.1.
The Washington court in Escalante relied heavily upon the analysis of the
Colorado Supreme Court in Caldwell, 644 P.2d 26. The Caldwell decision is
significant for its recognition of a fraud exception to the attorney-client doctrine as
an issue that could be raised in a bad-faith claim. In Caldwell, the plaintiffs were the
losing parties in a prior automobile personal injury case. Plaintiffs presented a
theory that the defendants had conspired to commit fraud in the underlying action,
resulting in the wrongful entry of summary judgment against plaintiffs. 644 P.2d at
28. Plaintiffs sought discovery of information, which would otherwise be privileged,
to show that the defendants had knowingly concealed or misrepresented material
information in the underlying case. Id. at 29-30. The Caldwell court noted its
previous recognition of the “future crimes” exception to the attorney-client privilege,
and agreed that it should extend that exception to cases involving communications
between attorneys and clients and when the privilege is used by the clients to commit
current or future fraud. Id. at 31-32. The party attempting to show that the
exception to the privilege applies must show a “foundation of fact for the charge.”
Id. at 33. However, the Caldwell court noted that the trial court may review the
requested documents in camera without having yet made that determination, thus
relying on the evidence in the review documents themselves to determine whether
the exception applies. Id. The Caldwell court also determined that the attorney need
not be aware of the client’s fraud for the exception to apply, but the client must show
that the advice is sought for a wrongful purpose. Id. Finally, the Caldwell court
determined that the work product doctrine is also subject to the crime or fraud
exception. Id. at 34.
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performed should be related to the qualifications of an attorney
69
before the privilege will attach. Thus, merely hiring an attorney
does not necessitate the attachment of the attorney-client privilege.
For example, in Merrin Jewelry Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance
70
Co., the insured sought discovery of investigative reports created by
the insurance company’s attorney. The court held that to the extent
the investigation and reports did not necessarily have to be
conducted by an attorney, using an attorney to conduct such work
did not “cloak with privilege matters that would otherwise be
71
discoverable.”
The tripartite relationship between the insurance company, its
appointed defense counsel, and the insured may trigger the so-called
72
“joint client exception” to the attorney-client privilege. Under this

69

See Tayler v. Travelers Ins. Co., 183 F.R.D. 67 (N.D.N.Y. 1998); Evans v. United
Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 541 S.E.2d 782, 791 (N.C. Ct. App.) (holding that insurance
company may not avail itself of privilege if attorney was not acting as a legal advisor
when communication was made), cert. denied, 547 S.E.2d 810 (N.C. 2001); West
Hampton Adult Home, Inc. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 481 N.Y.S.2d 358, 360 (App.
Div. 1984) (finding that hiring counsel to conduct policy “examinations under oath”
and to supervise investigation were activities normally performed in the ordinary
course of the insurance company’s business and were not unique to the
qualifications of an attorney).
70
49 F.R.D. 54 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
71
Id. at 57; cf. Zullig v. Kan. City Power & Light Co., No. Civ. A. 87-2342, 1989 WL
7901, at *2 (D. Kan. Jan. 17, 1989) (explaining that “[attorney-client] privilege is
triggered by the fact that the client is communicating with counsel for the purpose of
seeking legal advice”). However, there is consensus among courts and commentators
that the definition of the “practice of law” is broad. See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Brumbaugh,
355 So. 2d 1186, 1191-92 (Fla. 1978); Alan Morrison, Defining the Unauthorized Practice
of Law: Some New Ways of Looking at an Old Question, 4 Nova L.J. 363, 364-69 (1980);
Debra L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empirical
Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1981). Potentially, the
attorney-client privilege may exist where the advice does not involve licensed
attorneys. See generally Larry Alexander, What We Do and Why We Do It, 45 STAN. L.
REV. 1885, 1898-1900 (1993) (arguing that a juris doctorate is helpful but not
essential for professors producing “legal scholarship”).
72
See, e.g., Henke v. Iowa Home Mut. Cas. Co., 87 N.W.2d 920, 923 (Iowa 1958)
(holding that communications between insurance company and attorney employed
by it to defend insured were not privileged because the defense attorney represented
the insured and the insurance company). The Iowa Supreme Court limited Henke in
Squeller Feeds v. Pickering, 530 N.W.2d 678 (Iowa 1995). In that case, the court ruled
that Henke only applies to situations when the attorney is acting as attorney for both
the insured and the insurance company. Id. at 684; see also Hodges v. S. Farm Bureau
Cas. Ins. Co., 433 So. 2d 125, 132 (La. 1983) (“[The attorney’s] legal opinions or
theories concerning [the original suit] benefited not only [the insurance company]
who seeks to prevent their disclosure but also [the insured], who strives to discover
them.”). In Broussard v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Insurance Co., 519 So. 2d 136 (La.
1988), the Supreme Court of Louisiana stated that “blanket production of the
attorney’s and insurer’s files is not permitted.” Id.
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third exception, an insurance company may not invoke the attorneyclient privilege against its insured concerning communications with
73
the attorney hired to represent the insured.
Courts have
determined that the duty of loyalty runs to the insured, not the
insurance company. Thus, the insurance company cannot invoke the
74
privilege and prevent disclosure of confidential communications.
C. Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege
Express waivers of the attorney-client privilege are easy to
identify and are therefore not discussed herein. Whether an implied
waiver has occurred, however, is a vexing issue. Courts disagree
about the general contours of the test to be applied to determine
whether an implied waiver of the attorney-client privilege has
occurred. Courts also dispute at what point a client may be deemed
to have injected privileged communications with his or her attorney
into the case, thus causing an implied waiver. There are three
general approaches courts have used to determine whether the
75
attorney-client privilege has been impliedly waived by a litigant.
The first of these general approaches is the “automatic waiver”
rule, which provides that a litigant automatically waives the
privilege upon assertion of a claim, counterclaim, or affirmative
defense that raises as an issue a matter to which otherwise
privileged material is relevant. The second set of generalized
approaches provides that the privilege is waived only when the

The California courts have held that the “joint client exception” does not apply
to the appointment of Cumis (independent) counsel. See, e.g., Rockford Int’l Corp. v.
Superior Court, 26 Cal. App. 4th 1255, 1267 (1994). California courts have refused
to extend the “joint client exception” where the insurance company has hired
counsel to advise it on disputed coverage issues even though the insured argues the
issues of coverage are “a matter of common interest.” See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.
v. Superior Court, 153 Cal. App. 3d 467, 472 (1984); Houston Gen. Ins. Co. v.
Superior Court, 108 Cal. App. 3d 958, 961 (1980).
73
Henke, 87 N.W.2d at 923; Koster v. Junes Trucking, Inc., 625 N.W.2d 82, 84
(Mich. Ct. App. 2000) (explaining that attorney-client privilege is not recognized
between liability insurer and its insured because attorney hired to defend the insured
owed sole loyalty and duty to insured client, not the insurance company); Longo v.
Am. Policy Holders Ins. Co., 436 A.2d 577, 579-80 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1981)
(holding that insurance company was precluded from invoking attorney-client
privilege against its insured to prevent disclosure of confidential communications
between shared counsel); see also John K. Morris, Conflicts of Interest in Defending Under
Liability Insurance Policies: A Proposed Solution, 1981 UTAH L. REV. 457, 462 (observing
that “[a] minority of courts reject the dual representation principle,” while other
courts are split on who the true client is – the insurance company or the insured).
74
Koster, 625 N.W.2d at 84.
75
Frontier Ref., Inc. v. Gorman-Rupp Co., 136 F.3d 695, 699-700 (10th Cir.
1998); Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 764 F.2d 1577, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
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material to be discovered is both relevant to the issues raised in
the case and either vital or necessary to the opposing party’s
defense of the case.
Finally, several courts have recently
concluded that a litigant waives the attorney-client privilege if,
and only if, the litigant directly puts the attorney’s advice at issue
76
in the litigation.

1.

Automatic Waiver Rule

Under the automatic waiver rule, the attorney-client privilege is
waived upon an assertion of a civil claim or an affirmative defense
“that raises as an issue a matter to which otherwise privileged material
77
is relevant.” The automatic waiver rule works well when directed at
a plaintiff who initiates civil litigation. As one court has observed, the
civil plaintiff is a voluntary litigant who “has created the situation
78
which requires him to choose between his silence and his lawsuit.”
Where the plaintiff has initiated the action and forced a defendant
into court, the plaintiff cannot use privilege as both a sword and a
shield. In Lyons v. Johnson the court observed:
The scales of justice would hardly remain equal in these respects,
if a party can assert a claim against another and then be able to
block all discovery attempts against him by asserting [the attorneyclient] privilege to any interrogation whatsoever upon his claim.
If any prejudice is to come from such a situation, it must, as a
matter of basic fairness in the purposes and concepts on which
the right of litigation rests, be to the party asserting the claim and
not to the one who has been subjected to its assertion. It is the
former who has made the election to create an imbalance in the
79
pans of the scales.

Defendants ought not be denied a possible defense because
plaintiffs seek to invoke an alleged privilege. While this same
76

Frontier Ref., 136 F.3d at 699-700 (citations omitted).
Id. at 699; see Indep. Prods. Corp. v. Loew’s, Inc., 22 F.R.D. 266, 276-77
(S.D.N.Y. 1958) (originating “automatic waiver” rule); see also Lyons v. Johnson, 415
F.2d 540, 542 (9th Cir. 1969), cert denied, 397 U.S. 1027 (1970) (discussing Independent
Products and automatic waiver rule); FDIC v. Wise, 139 F.R.D. 168, 170-71 (D. Colo.
1991) (same).
78
Wehling v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 608 F.2d 1084, 1089 n.10 (5th Cir. 1979).
Typically, a civil plaintiff “voluntarily” brings litigation only because there is no other
effective means of protecting legal rights. See Marjorie S. White, Note, Plaintiff as
Deponent: Invoking the Fifth Amendment, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 158, 162 (1981)
(challenging the voluntary-involuntary distinction); Note, Toward a Rational Treatment
of Plaintiffs Who Invoke the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination During Discovery, 66 IOWA
L. REV. 575, 594-601 (1981).
79
Lyons, 415 F.2d at 542 (discussing specifically the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination).
77
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consideration exists where a civil defendant raises an affirmative
defense that is enmeshed in important evidence that will be
unavailable to plaintiff if privilege prevails, it is inescapable that the
defendant was not the principal initiator. The “automatic waiver”
rule has been criticized because it minimizes the importance of the
80
attorney-client privilege to the adversarial system.
2.

Intermediate Test Approach

The intermediate approach balances the need for discovery with
81
the importance of maintaining the attorney-client privilege.
In
82
Hearn v. Rhay, the court applied this approach. The court in Hearn
83
analyzed various exceptions to the rules of privilege. Principally, the
court reviewed the physician-patient privilege, which is waived by a
plaintiff-patient who files a lawsuit placing in controversy the patient’s
84
physical condition, and the attorney-client privilege, which is
impliedly waived in litigation between the attorney and client arising
85
The court also noted that in patent
out of their relationship.
infringement lawsuits, a privilege waiver may occur when the plaintiff
86
places the patent’s validity at issue.
In Hearn, the court found
persuasive an analogy to cases which have found an implied waiver of
the attorney-client privilege when a habeas corpus petitioner has
87
contested the constitutionality of his conviction in state court. In
the latter situation, other courts have permitted inquiry into the
attorney-client relationship to determine whether a “deliberate
88
bypass” of the right alleged to have been violated occurred.
A
80

See Greater Newbury Port Clam Shell Alliance v. Pub. Serv. Co., 838 F.2d 13, 19
(1st Cir. 1988) (criticizing “automatic waiver” rule); Afro-Lecan, Inc. v. United States,
820 F.2d 1198, 1205 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (same).
81
See Black Panther Party v. Smith, 661 F.2d 1243, 1266-69 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(balancing need for discovery with importance of privilege), vacated without opinion,
Moore v. Black Panther Party, 458 U.S. 1118 (1982).
82
68 F.R.D. 574, 581-82 (E.D. Wash. 1975).
83
Id. at 580-82.
84
Id. at 580.
85
Id.
86
Id.; see Honeywell, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 50 F.R.D. 117, 120 (M.D. Pa.
1970).
87
Hearn, 68 F.R.D. at 581.
88
See, e.g., Laughner v. United States, 373 F.2d 326, 327 (5th Cir. 1967);
Henderson v. Heinz, 349 F.2d 67, 70-71 (9th Cir. 1965).
A defendant may also waive the privilege by asserting advice of counsel as an
affirmative defense. See, e.g., Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888) (holding
that allegation that party was mislead by counsel resulted in waiver); Chevron Corp.
v. Pennzoil Co., 974 F.2d 1156, 1162 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that privilege was
waived when party claimed that its tax position was reasonable because it was based
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common denominator in these situations was that “the party asserting
the privilege placed information protected by [the attorney-client
privilege] in issue through some affirmative act for his own benefit,
and to allow the privilege to protect against disclosure of such
information would have been manifestly unfair to the opposing
89
party.” The Hearn court distilled the factors common to recognized
implied waiver situations:
(1) assertion of the privilege was a result of some affirmative act,
such as filing suit, by the asserting party; (2) through this
affirmative act, the asserting party put the protected information
at issue by making it relevant to the case; and (3) application of
the privilege would have denied the opposing party access to
90
information vital to his defense.

The Hearn court further instructed that when these three conditions
are present, “a court should find that the party asserting a privilege
91
has impliedly waived it through his own affirmative conduct.”
Significantly, the third prong of the Hearn test places the burden on
the party seeking discovery to show that the information is relevant
92
and material to the claim or defense.
One court has held that
disclosure of information vital to a party’s case should be compelled
“only after the litigant has shown that he has exhausted every
93
reasonable alternative source of information.”
Furthermore, the
party “must describe the information they hope to obtain and its
94
importance to their case with a reasonable degree of specificity.”
A court should begin this analysis with a presumption in favor of

on advice of counsel).
89
Hearn, 68 F.R.D. at 581.
90
Id.; see also Home Indem. Co. v. Lane Powell Moss & Miller, 43 F.3d 1322, 1326
(9th Cir. 1995) (interpreting Alaska law).
91
Hearn, 68 F.R.D. at 581.
92
Id. at 582. The burden is proportionate to the danger posed by the discovery
to the type of privilege being asserted. Where a constitutional privilege is involved,
for example, the First Amendment associational privilege, a heavy burden for
disclosure exists primarily because of the “preferred position of First Amendment
rights” in civil cases. Black Panther Party, 661 F.2d at 1268; see also Zenith Radio Corp.
v. United States, 764 F.2d 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (rejecting the automatic waiver rule
to protect non-constitutional privileges). The Sixth Amendment provides a shield
for the attorney-client privilege only in criminal proceedings. Upon the termination
of these proceedings and initiation of a civil action putting the privilege at issue, that
constitutional protection ends. The liberal federal policy favoring discovery is of
substantially greater relative weight where the party invokes the privilege in a civil
rather than a criminal case. Indep. Prods. Corp. v. Loew’s, Inc., 22 F.R.D. 266, 27879 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
93
Black Panther Party, 661 F.2d at 1268.
94
Id.
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preserving the privilege. However, under the Hearn test, in civil
actions, fairness may require that the privilege holder surrender the
privilege in so far as it will weaken, in a meaningful way, the opposing
party’s ability to defend. The privilege will give way where a party
seeking to pierce the privilege can establish that the claim, and
probable defenses thereto, are enmeshed in important, vital evidence
that will be otherwise unavailable if the privilege prevails.
95
The Hearn test is followed by the majority of jurisdictions, but
the test is not without its critics. A significant minority of courts
criticize the Hearn analysis because it focuses excessively on the
asserted relevancy of the privileged communications while ignoring
96
the reason why the privilege is recognized in the first place. An
example of this criticism is found in Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc. v. Home
97
Indemnity Co. The court in Rhone-Poulenc observed that while the
Hearn court “dress[ed] up [its] analysis with a checklist of factors, [it]
appear[s] to rest on a conclusion that the information sought is
98
relevant and should in fairness be disclosed.”
Focusing on the
important justifications behind the attorney-client privilege, the
Rhone-Poulenc court expressed the criticism that the relationship
between a client and his or her attorney will suffer because of the
uncertainty regarding whether communications will remain
confidential.
Clients will face the greatest risk of disclosure for what may be the
most important matters. Furthermore, because the definition of
what may be relevant and discoverable from those consultations
95

See, e.g., Frontier Ref., 136 F.3d at 699-700, 701; Lane Powell Moss & Miller, 43
F.3d at 1326; see also Pyramid Controls, Inc. v. Siemens Indus. Automations, Inc., 176
F.R.D. 269, 272 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (describing Hearn as “the seminal case on ‘at issue’
waiver”); Timothy P. Glynn, Federalizing Privilege, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 59, 118-19 & n.260
(2002) (noting that a majority of jurisdictions follow a Hearn-like approach).
96
See Harter v. Univ. of Indianapolis, 5 F. Supp. 2d 657, 664-65 & n.2 (S.D. Ind.
1998) (stating that “better-reasoned cases” hold that the act of filing a lawsuit where
state of mind may be relevant does not waive privilege unless client specifically relies
on advice of counsel; contrary rule “effectively discourages a client from seeking legal
advice by removing the assurance of confidentiality”); Transamerica Title Ins. Co. v.
Superior Court, 233 Cal. Rptr. 825, 828-29 (Ct. App. 1987) (stating that “[p]rivileged
communications do not become discoverable simply because they are related to
issues in the litigation” and upholding privilege even though insurer’s general state
of mind was at issue in bad-faith claim where insurer stipulated that it would not rely
on advice-of-counsel defense). Other courts are more protective of the privilege and
will not find waiver unless the client directly relies on advice of counsel. See, e.g.,
Aranson v. Schroder, 671 A.2d 1023, 1030 (N.H. 1995) (holding that there is no
waiver unless “the privilege holder injects the privileged material itself into the
case”).
97
32 F.3d 851, 863 (3d Cir. 1994) (criticizing Hearn as of dubious validity).
98
Id. at 864.
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may depend on the facts and circumstances of as yet unfiled
litigation, the client will have no sense of whether the
communication may be relevant to some future issue, and will
have no sense of certainty or assurance that the communication
99
will remain confidential.

The court in Rhone-Poulenc found that the advice of counsel was
not placed in issue merely because it was relevant and that the advice
given did not necessarily become an issue merely because the
attorney’s advice might affect the client’s state of mind in a relevant
100
matter.
The advice of counsel is placed in issue where the client
asserts a claim or defense, and attempts to prove that claim or
defense by disclosing or describing an attorney-client
101
communication.
3.

Restrictive Test

Under this approach, a litigant waives the attorney-client
privilege if, and only if, the litigant directly puts the attorney’s advice
102
at issue in the litigation.
For example, when a client files a
malpractice action against his attorney, he or she may waive the
103
privilege as to particular communications. By placing the attorney’s
advice at issue, the client is waiving the privilege by requiring an
104
examination of the facts and issues relating to that advice.
D. Waiver Through Direct Assertion of the Advice-of-Counsel Defense
An insurance company may defend itself against allegations of
bad faith and malicious claim handling by providing evidence that it
105
relied upon the advice of competent counsel. The so-called advice99

Id.
Id. at 863.
101
Id.; see also Pittston Co. v. Allianz Ins. Co., 143 F.R.D. 66, 71 (D.N.J. 1992); N.
River Ins. Co. v. Phila. Reins. Corp., 797 F. Supp. 363, 370 (D.N.J. 1992).
102
Rhone-Poulenc, 32 F.3d at 863-64 (adopting restrictive test and criticizing more
liberal views of waiver; purpose of privilege still applies when “state of mind” is at
issue and single-minded focus on relevance “completely undermines the interest to
be served”; no waiver where plaintiffs had not “injected the advice of counsel as an
essential element of a claim”); see also Public Serv. Co. of N.M. v. Lyons, 10 P.3d 166,
173 (N.M. Ct. App. 2000) (rejecting the Hearn approach and adopting the RhonePoulenc test that there must be “an offensive or direct use of privileged information”
before the attorney-client privilege will be deemed to have been waived).
103
Rhone-Poulenc, 32 F.3d at 863.
104
Id. at 865.
105
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 279 Cal. Rptr. 116, 117-18
(Ct. App. 1991). Reliance on advice of counsel has also allowed insurers to avoid
punitive damages for bad-faith conduct. See, e.g., Gorman v. Southeastern Fid. Ins.
Co., 775 F.2d 655, 659-60 (5th Cir. 1985) (interpreting Mississippi law); see also
100
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107

of-counsel defense provides that when an insurer’s actions are in
conformity with advice given by its counsel, the insurer’s actions are
made in good faith. Thus, state of mind, an essential element that an
aggrieved policyholder must demonstrate in establishing insurer bad
108
109
faith, is nullified. Conversely, the rejection of counsel’s advice or
the failure to seek legal advice when prudent claim handling dictates

Melorich Builders, Inc. v. Superior Court, 207 Cal. Rptr. 47, 50 (Ct. App. 1984)
(holding that good faith reliance on advice of counsel is a “complete defense” to a
punitive damage claim).
106
For competing views on the scope of advice of counsel and its appropriateness,
compare James M. Fischer, Should Advice of Counsel Constitute a Defense for Insurer Bad
Faith?, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1447 (1994), with Michael Sean Quinn, The Advice-of-Counsel
Defense: A Response to Fischer, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1487 (1994). See generally Nielsen, supra
note 15, at 542-44.
107
The term “defense” is a misnomer. The advice of counsel is typically accepted
as only some evidence that, if believed, may tend to negate the claim that an
insurance company engaged in bad faith. Advice of counsel is less frequently
accepted as an absolute defense to a claim of bad faith. See Annotation, Reliance on,
or Rejection of, Advice of Counsel as Factor Affecting Liability in Action Against Liability
Insurer for Wrongful Refusal to Settle Claim, 63 A.L.R.3d 725, 730 (1975); cf. Crowe v.
Lucas, 595 F.2d 985, 992 (5th Cir. 1979) (“Reliance on advice of counsel does not
serve as an absolute defense to a civil rights action. Rather, it is among the calculus
of facts that a jury is to consider on the issue of good faith.”).
108
Guy O. Kornblum, The Current State of Bad Faith and Punitive Damages in the
United States, 23 TORT & INS. L.J. 812, 838-39 (1988). Many courts have articulated a
“fairly debatable” standard for insurer bad faith. See, e.g., Davis v. Cotton States Mut.
Ins. Co., 604 So. 2d 354, 358 (Ala. 1992); Deese v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 838
P.2d 1265, 1268 (Ariz. 1992); Garnett v. Transamerica Ins. Servs., 800 P.2d 656, 666
(Idaho 1990); Nassen v. Nat’l States Ins. Co., 494 N.W.2d 231, 236 (Iowa 1992), cert.
denied, 503 U.S. 1031 (1993); Pickett v. Lloyds of London, 621 A.2d 445, 453 (N.J.
1993); Tokles & Sons, Inc. v. Midwestern Indem. Co., 605 N.E.2d 936, 943 (Ohio
1992); Bartlett v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 538 A.2d 997, 1000 (R.I. 1988); In
re Certification of a Question of Law from the U.S. Dist. Court of S.D., W. Div.
(Champion v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co.), 399 N.W.2d 320, 324 (S.D. 1987); Newhouse v.
Citizens Sec. Mut. Ins. Co., 501 N.W.2d 1, 5-6 (Wis. 1993); First Wyo. Bank, N.A. v.
Cont’l Ins. Co., 860 P.2d 1094, 1101 (Wyo. 1993). For a different permutation of the
“fairly debatable” standard, see Hans Construction Co. v. Phoenix Assurance Co., 995
F.2d 53 (5th Cir. 1993), where the court, applying Mississippi law, held that the
retention and use of an independent expert gave the insurance company “arguable
reasons” for denying a claim. Conflicting opinions of the insurer’s counsel and the
policyholder’s counsel, after each has reviewed the facts and law, may legitimize the
presence of a fairly debatable dispute.
109
See, e.g., Md. Cas. Co. v. Elmira Coal Co., 69 F.2d 616, 620 (8th Cir. 1934); Am.
Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Cooper, 61 F.2d 446, 448 (5th Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 289 U.S.
736 (1933); Kinder v. W. Pioneer Ins. Co., 42 Cal. Rptr. 394, 398-99 (Ct. App. 1965);
Thompson v. Commercial Union Ins. Co. of N.Y., 250 So. 2d 259, 260 (Fla. 1971);
Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Trevethan, 390 So. 2d 724, 728 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.),
appeal denied, 392 So. 2d 1373 (Fla. 1980).
For a cynical discussion of insurer’s reliance on advice of counsel, see Lozier v. Auto
Owner’s Insurance Co., 951 F.2d 251, 255-56 (9th Cir. 1991) (interpreting Arizona
law).
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110

doing so may be evidence of bad faith.
Jurisdictions are split over the acceptance of the advice-of111
counsel defense. Whether the advice-of-counsel defense is available
may depend upon a particular jurisdiction’s legal standard regarding
the tort of bad faith. A definitive standard of bad faith is difficult to
formulate because the elements of the test change as the context
112
changes. Where the insurer’s state of mind is the focus of the badfaith claim of unreasonableness, the advice-of-counsel defense may be
113
In those jurisdictions where the tort requires proof of
applicable.

110

See H. Walter Croskey, Bad Faith in California: Its History, Development and Current
Status, 26 TORT & INS. L.J. 561, 579 (1991) (opining that insurers may be under duty
to consult with counsel at least in matters involving the reasonableness of settlement
demands). An interesting case is Allen v. Allstate Insurance Co., 656 F.2d 487, 489-90
(9th Cir. 1981), holding that, under California law, a jury could find that the
insurance company acted in bad faith when it relied on the litigation estimate
provided by counsel rather than on the litigation estimate prepared by the district
manager. The court characterized the attorney’s opinion as “wishful.” Id. at 489.
111
STEPHAN S. ASHLEY, BAD FAITH ACTIONS § 7:13 (1984 & Supp. 1993) (reporting
an almost even split between those jurisdictions that recognize the defense and those
that reject it).
112
See Nielsen, supra note 15. Commentators have offered varying views of how
many standards of bad faith exist. For an analysis of how commentators have offered
various opinions on the standard to determine bad faith, see Boyarski, supra note 15.
113
The link between the advice-of-counsel defense and the insurance company’s
state of mind can be seen in non-insurance cases. As an example, in Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Smith, 959 F.2d 936 (Fed. Cir. 1992), the advice of counsel was
advanced in a patent infringement case to negate the element of willfulness. The
court noted that “counsel’s opinion must be thorough enough . . . to instill a belief
in the infringer that the court might reasonably hold the patent is invalid, not
infringed, or unenforceable.” Id. at 944. In Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816
(Fed. Cir. 1992), the court noted that the advice-of-counsel defense does not lie
when the legal advice is not sufficient to instill in the client a basis for reasonable
belief in the accuracy and soundness of the advice. The court explained:
This . . . does not mean a client must itself be able to evaluate the legal
competency of its attorney’s advice to avoid a finding of willfulness.
The client would not need the attorney’s advice at all in that event.
That an opinion is “incompetent” must be shown by objective evidence.
For example, an attorney may not have looked into the necessary facts,
and, thus, there would be no foundation for his opinion. A written
opinion may be incompetent on its face by reason of its containing
merely conclusory statements without discussion of facts or obviously
presenting only a superficial or off-the-cuff analysis.
Id. at 829. The court also noted:
An opinion of counsel, of course, need not unequivocally state that the
client will not be held liable for infringement. An honest opinion is
more likely to speak of probabilities than certainties. A good test that
the advice given is genuine and not merely self-serving is whether the
asserted defenses are backed up with viable proof during trial which
raises substantial questions.
Id. n.9.
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the insurance company’s actual intent to harm, the advice-of-counsel
defense may undermine and diminish the required mental state
necessary to establish bad faith. It must be established that the
company knew or should have known that its conduct created an
114
unreasonable risk of harm to the insured.
Where the alleged bad
faith is based on the insurance company’s conduct, the advice of
counsel may become irrelevant because the insurance company’s
conduct should be evaluated against industry standards for claims
115
handling and claims processing.
Commentators have different views regarding the necessary
elements that give rise to the advice-of-counsel defense. One
116
commentator
has delineated four necessary elements of the
defense: “(1) the insurer sought counsel’s advice in good faith; (2)
the insurer disclosed all pertinent information to its attorney; (3) the
insurer acted on the advice in good faith; and (4) the attorney was
competent in the particular area of law and disinterested in the
117
matter.”
Although these proposed elements may be jointly sufficient to
establish the absence of bad faith, other commentators postulate that
fewer elements are necessary:
For example, it is not necessary that the insurer seek counsel’s
advice in good faith. The insurer might seek counsel’s advice in
bad faith and come into a state of good faith by having been
jolted by counsel’s vivid, perceptive, and well-reasoned opinion
letter. It also is not necessary that the insurer disclose all
pertinent information to its attorney. The insurer may not have
all of the pertinent information, and might commission the
lawyer to complete the investigation. Moreover, if the opinion
letter came to the correct conclusion, even though missing
pertinent information, if the insurer acted on the letter
appropriately, and if the failure to disclose all of the pertinent
information was nothing more than negligent, the opinion letter

114

See, e.g., Webb v. Int’l Indem. Co., 599 So. 2d 1144, 1146 (Ala. 1992); see also
Walbrook Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 513, 517-18 (Ct. App.
1992) (explaining that establishing good faith involves an inquiry into motive, intent,
and state of mind).
115
See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Savio, 706 P.2d 1258, 1275 (Colo. 1985) (“Whether an
insurer has acted reasonably in denying or delaying approval of a claim will be
determined on an objective basis, requiring proof of the standards of conduct in the
industry.”). But see Silberg v. Cal. Life Ins. Co., 521 P.2d 1103, 1109 (Cal. 1974)
(“The scope of the duty of an insurer to deal fairly with its insured is prescribed by
law and cannot be delineated entirely by customs of the insurance industry.”).
116
Nielsen, supra note 15.
117
Id. at 543 (emphasis omitted).
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118

Professor Quinn has identified criteria associated with the hiring
119
of counsel to analyze coverage questions: (1) reasonable judgment
must be exercised by the insurer in selecting experienced and
competent coverage counsel; (2) sufficient facts and information
must be provided for coverage counsel to render an appropriate
opinion; (3) coverage counsel reasonably appears to have researched,
investigated, and analyzed the issues; (4) coverage counsel
communicates the opinion in a reasonable way; that is, coverage
counsel’s analysis shows that objective consideration has been given
to the facts and issues, any alternatives, the law, how to present
arguments, and so forth; (5) the insurer thoughtfully considered the
coverage opinion; and (6) the insurer largely follows the advice of
120
counsel.
Furthermore, reliance on the advice of counsel must be
118

Michael Sean Quinn & Kimberly Steele, Insurance Coverage Opinions, 36 S. TEX.
L. REV. 479, 494-95 (1995). However, courts may take a contrary view. In Bertero v.
National General Corp., 529 P.2d 608 (Cal. 1974), the court observed:
[I]f the initiator acts in bad faith or withholds from counsel facts he
knew or should have known would defeat a cause of action otherwise
appearing from the information supplied, that [reliance on legal
advice] defense fails. Similarly, counsel’s advice must be sought in
good faith and “. . . not as a mere cloak to protect one against a suit for
malicious prosecution.”
Id. at 616 (citations omitted) (quoting Walker v. Jensen, 212 P.2d 569, 572 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1949)); see Read Corp., 970 F.2d at 829 & n.9.
119
Quinn, supra note 106.
120
Id. at 1489. The method by which the advice of coverage counsel is
communicated to the insurance company is through a so-called coverage opinion
letter. The components of this type of correspondence were discussed by Professors
Quinn and Steele:
Generally, insurance coverage opinions recite the issues; recount
and analyze the facts, if they are undisputed; make factual assumptions,
if the insurance company wants to know the law applicable to one or
more stipulated sets of facts; explore factual conflicts, if the facts are
disputed; set forth the applicable provisions of the insurance contract
verbatim; if necessary, interpret the language of the insurance contract
in light of the law; analyze the facts, or assumed or conflicting factual
scenarios, in the light of the contract as interpreted; provide reasoned
answers to the issues posed; and report any important deadlines. . . .
[T]here are two interconnected and overriding issues: Does the
insured have a right to be paid or to be provided with some service?
And, if so, how much or of what kind of service?. . . . The format of
opinions is fairly uniform. After reciting the opening pleasantries, they
set forth undisputed, assumed, or disputed version of the facts, as
appropriate; the applicable language of the contract; the law governing
the analysis of the contract; the analysis of the contract; the law
governing the domain of relevant facts; the legal rules governing how
to apply the contract to the facts; answers to the various issues; and
vindications of those answers. If there are qualifications or caveats,
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121

reasonable.
This requires, in part, that the insurance company
provide counsel with sufficient factual and other available, relevant
122
information necessary to offer an accurate opinion or advice.
Where an insurance company knows or has reason to know that the
advice of its counsel is incorrect, it will not be able to avoid bad-faith
123
liability exposure by claiming reliance. Finally, the advice must be
these are frequently stated, or repeated, at the end of the letter. . . .
Often, if the insurer needs to send some sort of letter to the insured, a
proposed draft will accompany the opinion letter. This might be an
unqualified affirmation of coverage, sometimes called an unqualified
acceptance of the claim; it might be a reservation of rights letter, by
which the insurer agrees to provide money or services, or to perform
additional investigations, without committing itself further; or it might
be a letter declining coverage, or as it is called in some property
insurance circles, a letter rejecting the claim.
Quinn & Steele, supra note 118, at 480-82 (paragraph structure omitted). Coverage
opinions “are epistolary, single-spaced, and long.” Id. at 484.
121
See, e.g., Burns v. Okla. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 11 P.3d 162 (Okla. 2000)
(acknowledging that reliance on advice of counsel can be a defense provided that
reliance was reasonable, and, because advice of counsel was against existing case law
and statutes, holding that reliance was unreasonable).
122
See, e.g., Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Smith, 375 S.E.2d 866, 868-70 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988)
(holding that where insurance company does not provide its counsel with all facts or
information necessary to offer an accurate opinion or advice, it cannot invoke the
defense); see also Bertero, 529 P.2d at 616-17.
123
See Allan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 656 F.2d 487, 489-90 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that
insurer’s reliance on obviously poor strategic advice of defense counsel did not
shield it from bad-faith claim). The case law has not addressed the probabilistic
relationship regarding the advice provided by counsel and a particular justification
for denying coverage. One commentator has discussed this dilemma:
[I]t is not likely that there will ever be helpful law on this point. It is
fairly obvious, in this context, that if a lawyer advises an insurance
company that a given argument on behalf of no coverage should
succeed before a court in a perfectly rational world, and if there is a
sixty percent chance that it will succeed in our world, then this should
constitute enough probability to defeat any suggestion of bad faith.
But there are complications. How the law treats assessments of
probability may depend upon whether the uncertainty derives from
fact, or whether it derives from law. Obviously, in an unsettled area of
the law, low probabilities as to the legal aspects of the opinion do not
necessarily mean that there is no reasonable basis for the carrier’s
action. Further, the factual aspects of the opinion may be complicated.
An insurance carrier is expected to know what happened with a high
degree of certainty in the absence of conflicting factual scenarios.
Obviously, if there are materially conflicting factual scenarios,
probability assessments are extremely difficult. Material and credible
factual disputes may, in and of themselves, constitute a reasonable basis
for denying the claim. The upshot of this discussion is that there is no
obvious connection between the probability that an opinion is right,
and whether the insurance carrier has a reasonable basis for denying a
claim. There is some relationship, to be sure, but the relationship is
complex.
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timely. An insurance company cannot bootstrap an incorrect
124
coverage decision by later consulting with counsel.
The nature of the communication must be examined. Where
the attorney is hired to perform claims adjusting or to act in a
capacity other than as a lawyer, the communications may not be
125
Some courts look to the “dominant purpose” of the
privileged.
communication to determine whether the attorney-client privilege
exists for communications between the insurance company and the
126
attorney.
The dominant purpose of the transaction must be to
transmit information in the course of the attorney’s professional
127
employment. “The relevant question is not whether [the attorney]
was retained to conduct an investigation, but rather, whether this
128
investigation was related to the rendition of legal services.”
Therefore, the parties must intend the communication to be
129
confidential.
The scope of the waiver that occurs when the advice-of-counsel

Quinn & Steele, supra note 118, at 497-98; see also Clemco Indus. v. Commercial
Union Ins. Co., 665 F. Supp. 816, 827-28 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (holding that the
insurance carrier had not acted in bad faith when it incorrectly relied upon the
definition of “occurrence” which was used to form a manifestation trigger theory in
the 1970s and 1980s but was currently outdated); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 792 P.2d 749 (Ariz. 1990) (reversing prior precedent and
finding that insurance company should have anticipated a change in the law).
124
See, e.g., Employers Mut. Cas. Co. v. Thompkins, 490 So. 2d 897, 900-05 (Miss.
1986); see also Beacon Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Reynolds, 799 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. App. 1990).
In Beacon, the insurance company wrongfully denied a claim which resulted in a state
board of insurance complaint. Months after denying the claim, and only in response
to the board’s demand, did the insurance company seek counsel. Id. at 397. The
insurance company attempted to introduce its counsel’s letter at trial as proof of its
reasonable claim denial. Id. The trial court refused to permit the letter’s
introduction. The court in Beacon concluded that the insurance company could not
have relied on its counsel’s advice in good faith given the timing of the letter. Id.
125
Mission Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Lilly, 112 F.R.D. 160, 163 (D. Minn. 1986) (holding
that the ordinary business of a party is outside the scope of attorney-client privilege);
Hercules, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F. Supp. 136, 147 (D. Del. 1977) (stating that
advice of counsel rendered on non-legal matters is not within scope of attorney-client
privilege); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. Rptr. 471, 476 (Ct. App.
1984).
126
See, e.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 191 Cal. Rptr. 871 (Ct. App.
1983).
127
Id. at 879. In Lanasa v. State, 71 A. 1058, 1064 (Md. 1909), the test utilized for
“legal advice” was whether the communications relate to professional advice and to
the subject matter about which such advice is sought.
128
In re Allen, 106 F.3d 582, 603 (4th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (holding that a determination of whether the investigation is privileged will
focus on whether the issues are routine or whether they are complex issues of law,
which intrinsically require sophisticated legal appraisals).
129
See In re Underwriters at Lloyds, 666 F.2d 55, 57 (4th Cir. 1981).
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130

defense is raised is unclear.
Once the insurance company
interposes the advice-of-counsel defense regarding a particular claim,
the correspondence between the attorney and the insurance
131
company is placed at issue and becomes discoverable.
A relevant
query at this juncture becomes whether reliance on the advice of
counsel acts as an implied waiver of other coverage opinions
prepared for the same insurance company by the same attorney (or
132
the same law firm). Waiver of the attorney-client privilege for one
communication may in some instances permanently waive the
133
privilege for all related communications.
E. Recent Expansion of Implied Waiver
Recently, the supreme courts of Delaware, Arizona, and Ohio
130

See Conkling v. Turner, 883 F.2d 431, 434-35 (5th Cir. 1989); Bowne of N.Y.C.,
Inc. v. Am. Base Corp., 150 F.R.D. 465, 487-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); SEC v. Forma, 117
F.R.D. 516, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Bd. of Trs. v. Coulter Corp., 118 F.R.D. 532, 533
(S.D. Fla. 1987); Russell v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 493 F. Supp. 456, 458
(S.D. Tex. 1980); Pitney-Bowes v. Mestre, 86 F.R.D. 444, 446-47 (S.D. Fla. 1980);
Handgards, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 413 F. Supp. 926, 929 (N.D. Cal. 1976);
Garfinkle v. Arcata Nat’l Corp., 64 F.R.D. 688, 689-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Republic Ins.
Co. v. Davis, 856 S.W.2d 158, 163 (Tex. 1993).
131
See, e.g., Ellison v. Gray, 702 P.2d 360, 363 (Okla. 1985).
132
One commentator has discussed this slippery slope:
Insurers frequently limit the number of firms they engage to provide
coverage opinions for good reasons. One of them is economic.
Another is that insurance coverage is a niche practice, where reservoirs
of learning and practical experience are extremely valuable. In legal
situations where there are recurrent themes and problems, forms are
used. Many coverage attorneys who have a large number of duty-todefend coverage opinions to deliver, develop a standardized discourse
upon the [state] law of the duty-to-defend. This befits a form, and
routinely appears in formal opinion letters.
If the waiver of the attorney-client privilege for a coverage opinion
might lead to the implied waiver of that privilege for other letters, this
matter must be carefully considered. The route from the letter
produced, to the letters not produced is quite simple.
The
policyholder might take the deposition of the lawyer who wrote the
coverage opinion and ask him which sections of the letter were canned.
If the lawyer identifies several, and is then induced to go on and say
that he frequently relies upon forms, the policyholder might have the
right to discover redacted versions of other letters on somewhat the
same topic.
Quinn & Steele, supra note 118, at 496.
133
See, e.g., Duplin Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1161-62
(D.S.C. 1974). But see Commonwealth v. Goldman, 480 N.E.2d 1023, 1027 (Mass.
1985) (holding that waiver will only apply to communications relating to same
object); Transamerica Title Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 233 Cal. Rptr. 825, 828 (Ct.
App. 1987) (holding that disclosure of limited number of attorney-client privilege
materials will not entitle opposing party to the materials relating to advice given).
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have rendered significant decisions regarding implied waiver in the
insurance bad-faith context. Although each of these courts utilizes
previously recognized analytic approaches to the implied waiver
question, the courts set a minimal threshold for waiver that is the
functional equivalent of a per se waiver rule. When an implied waiver
question arises, courts must objectively determine when the
privileged party’s conduct reaches a certain point of disclosure, such
that fairness requires that the privilege be waived irrespective of
whether the privileged person intended such waiver. In Delaware,
the threshold for waiver involved the insurance company’s statement
that it had engaged in “routine [claim] handling.” The Delaware
court examined in camera the insurance company’s claim file, and, on
its own initiative, found sufficient facts to conclude that waiver was
required. In Arizona, the “certain point” is reached when the
insurance company “claims its conduct was proper and permitted by
law and based in whole or in part on its evaluation of the state of the
law.” This situation exists in almost all insurance bad-faith cases. In
Ohio, as in Delaware, the court examined in camera the insurance
company’s claim file. If the court finds in its review any attorneyclient privileged communications that show a lack of good faith,
those communications are “wholly unworthy of the protections
afforded by any claimed privilege.” In Ohio, the mere filing of a badfaith case entitles a court to an in camera review of the insurance
company’s attorney-client privileged communications. Collectively,
the Delaware, Arizona, and Ohio precedents may represent a trend in
the law regarding implied waiver that will have a chilling effect upon
attorney-client communications in the insurance context. The
Delaware, Arizona, and Ohio precedents are discussed below.
1.

Tackett v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Insurance Co.
(Delaware)
134

In Tackett v. State Farm, an insured sued State Farm for bad
faith, claiming that the insurance company had wrongfully attempted
to underpay, and then delayed payment of, an underinsured motorist
135
claim following a company “get tough” policy.
The “get tough”
policy was established to limit an expected increase in bodily injury
136
claims.
State Farm took the position that it had “reasonable
137
When pressed for an
justification” for underpayment and delay.
134
135
136
137

Tackett v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 653 A.2d 254 (Del. 1995).
Id. at 256-57.
Id.
Id. at 258.
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explanation of this “reasonable justification,” State Farm responded
by stating in an answer to an interrogatory, that the claims-handling
process “show[ed] a reasonable and orderly pattern of claims
handling which ultimately and in due course led to the payment of
138
the policy coverage.”
The insured then sought discovery of the
139
State Farm withheld certain
basis of State Farm’s position.
documents, claiming that both attorney-client privilege and the work
140
product doctrine applied.
After an in camera examination of the
141
pertinent documents, the trial court ordered their disclosure. The
Delaware Supreme Court affirmed. In doing so, the supreme court
noted that “waiver of the attorney client privilege may be implicit,
142
even if contrary to the party’s actual intent.” The court explained
that considerations of fairness and consistency are perforce included
in determining waiver:
A privileged person would seldom be found to waive, if his
intention not to abandon could alone control the situation.
There is always also the objective consideration that when his
conduct touches a certain point of disclosure, fairness requires
that his immunity shall cease whether he intended the result or
143
not.

After acknowledging that in the context of the attorney-client
privilege, waiver rests on the rationale of fairness (that is, disclosure
of otherwise privileged information by the client under circumstances
where “it would be unfair to deny the other party an opportunity to
144
discover other relevant facts with respect to that subject matter” ),
the court noted that a party cannot compel an insurance company to
surrender the protections of the attorney-client privilege simply by
145
bringing a bad-faith lawsuit.
“Where, however, an insurer makes
factual assertions in defense of a claim which incorporate, expressly or
implicitly, the advice and judgment of its counsel, it cannot deny an
opposing party ‘an opportunity to uncover the foundation for those

138

Id. (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 257.
140
Tackett, 653 A.2d at 257.
141
Id.
142
Id. at 259.
143
Id. (quoting 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2327
(J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961)).
144
Id. (quoting Hercules, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 343 F. Supp. 136, 156 (D. Del.
1977)).
145
Id. (citing generally Hoescht Celanese Corp. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of
Pittsburgh, 623 A.2d 1118, 1125 (Del. Super. Ct. 1992)).
139
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146

assertions in order to contradict them.’”
The court in Tackett concluded that the insured had met the
exacting standards for a finding of implied waiver of the attorney147
client privilege. In its answer, State Farm contended that it did not
unreasonably deny the insured’s claim, and raised the affirmative
defense of failure of the insured to provide information necessary for
148
the insurer to process the claim.
Although this defense did not
directly relate to any protected communications, the court observed
that it did “suggest that there was nothing in the routine handling of
149
the claim that contributed to the delay.”
When State Farm was
required to set forth the reasons to support its claim of reasonable
justification for non-payment, it relied upon the affidavit of one of its
claims superintendents who was responsible for handling the Tackett
150
claim. The affidavit cited in relevant part the following:
Based on my experience of ten years, this claim was handled
routinely, without any undue delay, with no bad faith on the part
of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company or its
employees. Furthermore, no reason existed to handle this claim
unlike any other claim that comes through this office, and based
on my experience, State Farm handled this claim as expediently
as any other claims office in this local [sic] would have handled a
151
similar claim.

Reviewing these facts the court in Tackett observed:
Once State Farm alleged particularized facts that implicitly relied
upon communications with counsel contained in the Tacketts’
file, the first prong of the waiver analysis was satisfied—disclosure
of otherwise protected facts relevant to a particular subject matter
relied upon as a defense.
. . . Here, once State Farm alleged a routine handling of the
Tacketts’ claim and suggested that any delay was attributable to
inaction on the part of the insured, the Tacketts could challenge
those allegations only with a full showing of the facts contained in
the claim file. To rule otherwise would permit State Farm to gain
the inference that, not only was the claim handled routinely, but
the routine analysis of the claim supported the delay in payment.
Fairness requires that assertions of fact be tested by disclosure.

146

Tackett, 653 A.2d at 259 (quoting Friction Div. Prods., Inc. v. E.I. Du Pont De
Nemours & Co., 117 F.R.D. 535, 538 (D. Del. 1987)).
147
Id.
148
Id.
149
Id.
150
Id. at 260.
151
Id. at 258.
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Without access to the complete file, the Tacketts would be unable
to challenge State Farm’s assertions and would be forced to
152
accept as true its claim of routine handling.

The Tackett court, therefore, recognized that “[a] party cannot force
an insurer to waive the protections of the attorney-client privilege
153
merely by bringing a bad faith claim.” The court also emphasized
154
that the standard for waiver is “exacting,” and warned that its
holding “does not create a rule of per se waiver of the attorney-client
155
privilege in insurance bad faith cases.”
The court expressly rejected the notion that it was creating a
rule of per se waiver of the attorney-client privilege in insurance bad156
faith cases. The court observed, however, that where an insurance
company “makes factual representations which implicitly rely upon
legal advice as justification for non-payment of claims, the insurer
cannot shield itself from disclosure of the complete advice of counsel
157
relevant to the handling of the claim.”
At issue in Tackett was the
advice State Farm received from its outside counsel, which was
contained within the State Farm claim file. In its internal evaluation
report, a State Farm claims representative had evaluated the Tacketts’
settlement demand and supporting documentation, and concluded
158
State
that the claim was valued at between $45,000 and $50,000.
Farm established a $50,000 reserve on the claim but ordered an
independent medical examination (IME) because it was possible that
159
a previous accident had contributed to the insured’s condition.
152

Tackett, 653 A.2d at 260.
Id. at 259.
154
Id.
155
Id. at 260.
156
Id. Tellingly, several subsequent Delaware cases applying Tackett have held that
insurers have not waived the privilege by denying bad faith. See Clausen v. Nat’l
Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 730 A.2d 133, 143 (Del. Super. Ct. 1997) (holding no waiver
where insurer merely “denied having no reasonable justification for its actions”);
Ruger v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., No. 93C-04-210, 1996 WL 769793, at *6
(Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 27, 1996) (no waiver where insurer did not assert affirmative
defenses and merely asserted in a letter that its policy interpretation was proper
without any partial disclosure of facts); Kemper Ins. v. Soligo, No. 95 C-08-266-WTQ,
1996 WL 944919, at *1-*2 (Del. Super. Ct. May 9, 1996) (holding no waiver, even
though privileged communications conceivably could have been implicated, where
insurer asserted medical expert opinion as reasonable justification for claims
handling). But see Wolhar v. Gen. Motors Corp., 712 A.2d 457 (Del. 1997) (“The
Court cannot permit [a litigant] to make bare, factual allegations that are central to
the dispute between the parties and then permit [it] to assert the attorney-client
privilege as a barrier to the better understanding of the factual situation.”).
157
Tackett, 653 A.2d at 260.
158
Id.
159
Id. at 257.
153

2004

ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE & WAIVER

551

State Farm’s outside counsel, however, reported that “the possible
160
benefit of an independent medical examination is questionable.”
Outside counsel also advised the State Farm claims representative
that “the arbitrator would probably find the [Tacketts’] claim had a
value of $50,000 or more even though it has some obvious
161
The doctor performing the IME notified State Farm
disabilities.”
that “Mrs. Tackett does not have any impressive neurological signs,”
162
but that the accident in question did trigger a prior back condition.
As a result of the IME findings, State Farm authorized a payment of
163
$30,000 and made an initial offer of $20,000. The settlement offer
was rejected, and counsel for the insured repeated a prior demand
164
for the policy limits. Shortly thereafter, the file was transferred to a
165
The new claims superintendent
new claims superintendent.
concluded, after a full review of the claims file, that State Farm had
undervalued the claim. Therefore, a written offer of policy limits was
166
sent to the Tacketts’ attorney. Although the court determined that
State Farm had waived the attorney-client privilege, the finding of
waiver did not automatically relinquish the protection provided by
167
the work product doctrine.
Recognizing the landscape of this
168
debate, the court rejected the contention that Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(b)(3) grants absolute immunity to opinion work
160

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
162
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
163
Tackett, 653 A.2d at 257.
164
Id.
165
Id.
166
Id.
167
Id. at 260.
168
The court in Tackett observed:
On the one hand, courts continually seek to provide an atmosphere in
which clients may have unfettered communications with counsel, and
in which attorneys may freely develop a client’s case without undue
interference from opposing counsel. On the other hand, a bad faith
claim against an insurer cannot be proven without sufficient access to
the claim file which frequently contains opinion work product.
Id. at 261 (citations omitted). This dilemma has “generated significant commentary
and a conflict among courts when deciding whether to allow a party to discover
opinion work product.” Id.; see, e.g., Andrea L. Borgford, Comment, The Protected
Status of Opinion Work Product: A Misconduct Exception, 68 WASH. L. REV. 881 (1993);
Papetti, supra note 3; Donna Goodin Payne, Note, Insurer Bad Faith: The Need for an
Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege, 11 REV. LITIG. 111 (1991); Jayne E. Powell &
Ellen L. Lyons, Alaska Supreme Court Year in Review 1990, 8 ALASKA L. REV. 70 (1990);
see also Diego C. Asencio, F.S. 624.155 Actions: The Expanding Field of Claimants, Claims
and Complexities, 9 TRIAL ADVOC. Q. 31, 37 (1990); Nielsen, supra note 15; Thomas E.
Workman, Plaintiff’s Right to the Claim File, Other Claim Files and Related Information: The
Ticket to the Gold Mine, 25 TORT & INS. L.J. 137 (1988).
161

552

Vol. 34:513

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

product. Thus, the court declined to read the mandatory language
of the rule as establishing an impenetrable barrier to discovery of
169
opinion work product.
2.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Lee
(Arizona)
170

In State Farm Mutual Auto. Insurance Co. v. Lee, the Arizona
Supreme Court explored the contours of the “at issue” implied waiver
171
doctrine as it related to the attorney-client privilege.
In Lee, a class representing approximately one thousand State
Farm insureds brought suit against State Farm contesting the
systematic denial of uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage
172
Between 1988 and 1995, State Farm rejected
stacking claims.
173
stacking claims in single loss situations. It was State Farm’s practice
169

Tackett, 635 A.2d at 262.
13 P.3d 1169 (Ariz. 2000).
171
Arizona law provides that information contained in communications between
attorney and client in the context of the attorney-client relationship is confidential if
maintained in confidence. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-2234 (2003). Generally, the Arizona
courts “construe privilege statutes narrowly because they exclude relevant evidence
and impede the fact-finder’s search for the truth.” Blazek v. Superior Court, 869
P.2d 509, 511 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994); see also Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints v. Superior Court, 764 P.2d 759, 764 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988). This is consistent
with the law of other jurisdictions. See, e.g., United States v. Mierzwicki, 500 F. Supp.
1331, 1334 (D. Md. 1980) (“Any examination of the attorney-client privilege should
begin with the observation that privileges are not favored in the law and are seen as a
hinderance to litigation.”); League v. Vanice, 374 N.W.2d 849, 856 (Neb. 1985);
Cohen v. Jenkintown Cab Co., 257 A.2d 689, 693-94 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976);
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 77, at 156 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 2d ed. 1972) (noting
that privilege serves only to “shut out the light”).
Under Arizona law, the attorney-client privilege belongs to the client and serves
“to encourage free exchange of information between the attorney and the client to
promote the administration of justice.” State v. Holsinger, 601 P.2d 1054, 1058 (Ariz.
1979). The privilege encourages clients to tell their lawyers the truth. “Unless the
lawyer knows the truth, he or she cannot be of much assistance to the client.”
Samaritan Found. v. Goodfarb, 862 P.2d 870, 874 (Ariz. 1993). Thus, the privilege
under Arizona law is “central to the delivery of legal services.” Id. The privilege,
however, may be waived either expressly or implicitly if the person that holds the
privilege voluntarily discloses information within its purview. Danielson v. Superior
Court, 754 P.2d 1145, 1148-49 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987).
172
Lee, 13 P.3d at 1171.
173
There are two types of stacking in the automobile insurance context. Intrapolicy stacking can occur when the stated per person policy limits are multiplied by
the number of vehicles covered by the policy. Courts in other jurisdictions have
permitted this type of stacking. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Randall, 753 F.2d 441 (5th
Cir. 1985) (applying Mississippi law); Am. Ins. Co. v. Takahashi, 575 P.2d 881 (Haw.
1978); Chaffee v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 591 P.2d 1102 (Mont. 1979);
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Maglish, 586 P.2d 313 (Nev. 1978); Am. States Ins. Co. v. Milton,
573 P.2d 367 (Wash. 1978). Professor Long, in his treatise on liability insurance law,
170
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to issue separate insurance policies covering each vehicle in a
174
multiple vehicle household. When losses occurred for which there
were insufficient insurance funds to compensate the insured from the
other tortfeasor’s insurance policies, the State Farm class members
presented underinsured motorist claims to State Farm for additional
175
State Farm rejected these claims based on the
compensation.
176
which permitted insurance
wording of A.R.S. § 20-259.01(H),
177
companies to use anti-stacking policy clauses to eliminate stacking.
In 1995, however, the Arizona Supreme Court, in State Farm Mutual
178
Insurance Co. v. Lindsey, determined that the anti-stacking language

commented on this type of policy limit stacking:
The most common rationale used by courts in permitting intra-policy
stacking is that a combination of the limits of liability clause and the
payment of separate premiums creates an ambiguity, which must, of
course, be construed against the insurer. An argument (in addition to
the statute) is that since a premium was paid for the coverage, claimant
is entitled to the coverage. Since the coverage is a contract benefit
which has been paid for, plaintiff is not seeking a windfall as a result of
his injury, but full indemnity based on payment of separate premiums.
When separate premiums are paid, and allocated, for each vehicle
listed, considerations of equity apply. As stated by Professor Widiss:
A premium has been paid for each of the endorsements
and coverage has been issued. It seems both equitable
and desirable to permit recovery under more than one
endorsement until the claimant is fully indemnified.
3 ROWLAND H. LONG, THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 24.27 (1990) (footnotes
omitted) (quoting A. WIDISS, A GUIDE TO UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE 112
(1969)). However, the Arizona courts do not permit this type of stacking. See, e.g.,
Hampton v. Allstate Ins. Co., 616 P.2d 78 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980). The court in
be
Hampton rejected the insured’s argument that stacking should permitted because a
separate premium was charged for the coverage available on each vehicle. In
responding to this argument, the court found that the individual premium charge
was justified because of the additional risk associated with covering multiple vehicles.
Id. at 80-81.
Interpolicy stacking arises in multi-policy situations. “Other insurance” clauses
are typically used by the insurance industry to eliminate the stacking of coverages in
multiple-policy situations. The typical anti-stacking clause contains two essential
provisions. First, the policy requires coverage to be prorated. Second, the policy
establishes a total coverage limit available for the loss to which the prorated
percentage applies. Unless the policy places a limit on the amount of the loss,
stacking can occur. See, e.g., Barrett v. Farmer’s Ins. Group, 220 Cal. Rptr. 135 (Ct.
App. 1985); Menke v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 386 N.E.2d 1133 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979);
Bishop v. Washington, 480 A.2d 1088 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).
174
Lee, 13 P.3d at 1171.
175
Id.
176
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 20-259.01(H) (2003) (formerly ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 20259.01(F)).
177
Id.
178
897 P.2d 631 (Ariz. 1995).
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179

used by State Farm was legally insufficient to prevent stacking.
The class member insureds argued that even before the court’s
decision in Lindsey, State Farm knew the anti-stacking clause was
180
invalid. Therefore, State Farm acted in bad faith when, from 1988
181
to 1997, State Farm denied its insureds’ requests to stack coverage.
State Farm maintained that until Lindsey was decided, it had acted
reasonably in interpreting A.R.S. § 20-259.01(H) in conjunction with
182
its policy language in order to preclude stacking.
During discovery State Farm acknowledged having received the
advice of counsel regarding whether to pay or reject class member
183
claims.
State Farm asserted the attorney-client privilege regarding
the production of counsel’s coverage analysis, but declared that it
would not advance a good faith defense based on the advice of
184
counsel.
The trial court accepted State Farm’s position that it
185
would not advance an advice-of-counsel defense directly.
Thus,

179

In Lindsey, the court held that the provisions of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 20-259.01(F)
(now, subsection (H)) are not self-executing because the wording of the statute is
merely permissive. 897 P.2d at 633. To be effective, “[a]dditional policy language is
needed to incorporate the limitation into a policy.” Id.
The importance of having appropriate court “anti-stacking” language in the
policy was demonstrated in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Herron, 599
P.2d 768 (Ariz. 1979), where the insurance company argued that stacking was
prohibited under Arizona law generally: “[A]ppellee argues that the law of Arizona
does not allow ‘stacking’ of uninsured motorist coverages and that appellant may not
collect an additional $35,000 under the provisions of his own policy because this
would constitute ‘stacking’.” Id. at 771. In rejecting this argument, the court stated:
“We recognized the elementary principle of contract law that if one wishes to buy
more coverage, he may do so and the extent of that coverage will depend on the
terms of the contract.” Id. The “other insurance” clause in Herron was an excess type
and did not preclude stacking. Indeed, the court in Herron acknowledged that the
case did not involve a stacking question. Id. at 772. The court gave effect to the
excess clause. Id. at 772-73.
180
Lee, 13 P.3d at 1172.
181
Id.
182
Id. State Farm argued that its position rejecting stacking was not unreasonable
because of the unsettled status of Arizona law. State Farm cited Giannini v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 837 P.2d 1203, 1206 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992), in which
Division One held that the anti-stacking provision in State Farm’s policy was
sufficient to invoke the statute and precluded stacking. See also State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Lindsey, 885 P.2d 144, 150 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (Division One again
holding that anti-stacking provision in State Farm’s policies “plainly encompass[es
the statute’s] limitation on stacking”). But see State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Berardi, No. 2 CA-CV 93-0051 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) (mem.), review denied, (Mar. 16,
1994) (Division Two requiring State Farm to permit stacking of policyholder’s
uninsured motorist/underinsured motorist claims).
183
Lee, 13 P.3d at 1172.
184
Id. The documents involved communications with 15 different law firms. Id.
185
Id. at 1173.
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State Farm would not be able to rely upon the objective
186
reasonableness of its decision to deny stacking.
State Farm did
assert the subjective good faith of its claims managers in deciding to
deny stacking, and argued that their beliefs were reasonable in light
187
of their understanding of the law at that time. Because State Farm
avowed to the trial court “that it would defend in part on what its
decisionmakers knew, thought and did,” the trial court determined
that State Farm’s knowledge “included advice of counsel because that
188
The trial court held,
was a part of the basis for the defense.”
therefore, “that State Farm impliedly waived the privilege when it put
at issue the subjective legal knowledge of its managers after they
189
sought and received legal advice.”
The Arizona Court of Appeals accepted jurisdiction and vacated
190
the trial court’s discovery order.
The court of appeals held that
State Farm had not impliedly waived the privilege or put its attorneyclient communications at issue because it had only refuted plaintiff’s
allegations, and had not injected privilege-related issues into the
191
192
As a threshold matter, the court adopted the three-prong
case.
193
test for “at issue” implied waivers set forth in Hearn v. Rhay.
The Arizona Supreme Court rejected the view that implied
waiver will be found only when the party advances an express claim of
194
reliance on advice of counsel. The court noted that if the client’s
intent not to abandon the privilege could alone control the situation,
195
then waiver would seldom be found.
Thus, the determination of

186

Id.
Id.
188
Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
189
Lee, 13 P.3d at 1173.
190
In discovery matters, Arizona trial judges have broad discretion, and their
decisions are reviewed only for abuse. See Brown v. Superior Court, 670 P.2d 725,
729 (Ariz. 1983).
191
Lee, 13 P.3d at 1173.
192
Id.
193
68 F.R.D. 574, 581 (E.D. Wash. 1975). Hearn involved a prisoner plaintiff’s
claim that the government had violated his constitutional rights by confining him to
a mental health unit without a hearing or review. Id. at 577. The government
asserted the defense of qualified immunity, alleging that it acted in the good-faith
belief that its actions did not violate any clearly established constitutional right. Id.
The government expressly disavowed reliance on advice of counsel. Id. at 581 n.5.
Nonetheless, the Hearn court found that the assertion of the defense was an
affirmative act that made the government’s communication with counsel relevant,
and the denial of access to those communications would have been manifestly unfair
to the plaintiff. Id. at 581-82.
194
Lee, 13 P.3d at 1178.
195
Id. (citing 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2327, at
187
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whether implied waiver has occurred also includes an objective
consideration: when one’s conduct reaches a “certain point of
disclosure,” fairness demands that the privilege be waived regardless
196
of the privileged person’s intentions.
Turning to this inquiry, the
court recognized that there was “a great deal of confusion” in this
area, and then quoted the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing
Lawyers in describing various approaches used in other jurisdictions:
At least three approaches to the waiver [issue exist]: The first
approach radically holds that, whenever a party seeks judicial
relief, the party impliedly waives the privilege. A second approach
would attempt to balance the need for disclosure against the need
for protecting the confidentiality of the client’s communications
on the facts of the individual case. The third approach avoids the
extremes of an over-inclusive automatic-waiver rule or an
indeterminate, ad hoc balancing approach. Instead, it focuses on
whether the client asserting the privilege has interjected the issue
into the litigation and whether the claim of privilege, if upheld,
would deny the inquiring party access to proof needed fairly to
197
resist the client’s own evidence on that very issue.

Privilege is waived under the first two views “whenever a client’s
198
mental state was in issue.”
The court observed that this approach
was “dubious absent acceptance of the Benthamite principle that the
199
privilege ought to be overthrown to facilitate the search for truth.”
The court in Lee adopted the third, intermediate approach as being
200
least restrictive of the three approaches outlined above.
By
adopting this approach, the court “reject[ed] the idea that the mere
filing of a bad faith action, the denial of bad faith, or the affirmative
claim of good faith may be found to constitute an implied waiver of
201
Waiver will occur, however, if the privileged party
the privilege.”
has asserted a claim or defense—for example, that its evaluation of
the law was reasonable—which would include, necessarily, the
202
information received from its counsel. At that point the privileged
party has injected “the issue of advice of counsel into the litigation to
the extent that recognition of the privilege would deny the opposing
636 (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961)).
196
Id. The court in Lee questioned where that “certain point” is reached in which
fairness requires waiver. Id. at 1178-79.
197
Id. at 1179 (internal citations omitted) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 80 cmt. b (1998)).
198
Id.
199
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
200
Lee, 13 P.3d at 1179.
201
Id.
202
Id.
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party access to proof without which it would be impossible for the
203
factfinder to fairly determine the very issue raised by that party.”
The court in Lee concluded that the “certain point” at which
fairness requires waiver is reached when “the party asserting the
privilege claims its conduct was proper and permitted by law and
204
based in whole or in part on its evaluation of the state of the law.”
When this occurs, the privileged party’s knowledge about the law
becomes central, and the advice of its counsel, highly relevant to the
205
legal implications of the privileged party’s conduct.
In this
situation, “the truth cannot be found absent exploration of [the]
206
issue.” A contrary finding would result in “unfairness not just to the
party opposing assertion of the privilege but to the entire [judicial]
207
system.”
Preemptively, the majority focused on Justice Martone’s
dissenting opinion. The court agreed with the dissent that it was the
plaintiffs who had raised the issue of subjective bad faith among State
Farm’s employees, but noted that the waiver of the privilege was not
208
based on State Farm’s denial of that allegation.
Further, State
Farm’s affirmative assertion of good faith did not waive the
209
privilege. The court then identified the basis for its decision:
It is, rather, State Farm’s affirmative assertion that its actions were
reasonable because of its evaluation of the law, based on its
interpretation of the policies, statutes, and case law, and because
of what its personnel actually knew and did.
But what its personnel did, presumably among other things, was
to consult counsel and obtain counsel’s views of the meaning of
the policies, statutes, and case law. Having asserted that its
actions were reasonable because of what it knew about the
applicable law, State Farm has put in issue the information it
210
obtained from counsel.

Although State Farm did not specifically state that legal “advice
211
was relevant to the legal significance of its conduct,” an assertion
that the insurance company relied upon advice of counsel would be

203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211

Id.
Id. at 1178, 1179.
Id. at 1179.
Lee, 13 P.3d at 1179.
Id.
Id. at 1181.
Id.
Id. at 1180-81.
Id. at 1181.
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“the functional equivalent of an express advice-of-counsel defense.”
The court noted that “[m]ost sophisticated litigants [would] know
213
better than to dig that hole for themselves.”
The concept of
implied waiver does not “require such a magical admission,” nor does
it require the court to “accept as dispositive the client’s assertion that
214
it did not rely on the advice it received.” The majority found that a
215
contrary holding would make “a mockery of the law.” On the one
hand, an insurance company could argue “that it acted reasonably
because it made a legal evaluation from which it concluded that the
216
law permitted it to act in a certain manner,” while, on the other
hand, it would allow that same insurance company “to withhold from
its adversary and the factfinder information it received from counsel
217
on that very subject.”
In that situation, “[t]he sword and shield
218
metaphor would truly apply.”
The court found that “[b]y asserting the subjective evaluation
and understanding of its personnel about the state of the law on
stacking, State Farm has affirmatively injected the legal knowledge of
its claims managers into the litigation and put the extent, and thus
219
the sources, of this legal knowledge at issue.” Thus, the insurance
company will be precluded from testifying “that they investigated the
state of the law and concluded [that they] believed they were acting
within the law but deny Plaintiffs the ability to explore the basis for
this belief and to determine whether [the insurance company] might
220
have known its actions did not conform to the law.”
The court, however, limited the scope of its ruling. As an
example, the court noted that its holding did not have the effect of
waiving the privilege for communications between the insurer and
outside counsel on subjects merely pertaining to the legal question at
221
issue. In essence,
[p]laintiffs are not entitled to a fishing expedition through all of
counsel’s communications . . . but only to discovery of those
communications pertaining to the permissibility or deniability of
the [legal issue] under the policy language, the case law, and the
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221

Lee, 13 P.3d at 1181.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1182.
Id.
Id.
Lee, 13 P.3d at 1182.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. n.8.
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statutes as they existed at the time the claims were presented.

Ultimately, the court held that the trial judge had not
committed legal error or abused his discretion by permitting
223
discovery of attorney-client privileged materials.
The court also
224
and adopted the test set forth in
approved the Hearn test,
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 80(1), which
provides, in relevant part, that:
The attorney-client privilege is waived for any relevant
communication if the client asserts as to a material issue in a
proceeding that:
(a)the client acted upon the advice of a lawyer or that the advice
was otherwise relevant to the legal significance of the client’s
225
conduct . . . .

The court rejected the notion “that the mere filing of a bad faith
action, the denial of bad faith, or the affirmative claim of good faith
226
may be found to constitute an implied waiver of the privilege.” The
court found that a party does not waive the attorney-client privilege
unless it has asserted some claim or defense, such as the
reasonableness of its evaluation of the law, which necessarily
includes the information received from counsel. In that situation,
the party claiming the privilege has interjected the issue of advice
of counsel into the litigation to the extent that recognition of the
privilege would deny the opposing party access to proof without
which it would be impossible for the factfinder to fairly determine
the very issue raised by that party. We believe such a point is
reached when, as in the present case, the party asserting the
privilege claims its conduct was proper and permitted by law and
based in whole or in part on its evaluation of the state of the law.
In that situation, the party’s knowledge about the law is vital, and
the advice of counsel is highly relevant to the legal significance of
the client’s conduct. Add to that the fact that the truth cannot be
found absent exploration of that issue, and the conditions of
227
RESTATEMENT § 80 are met.

The deposition of Gillespie, State Farm’s Tucson claims
superintendent, demonstrated the unfairness of this aspect of the
judicial system. The review of the deposition indicated that Gillespie
222

Id.
Id. at 1184.
224
See Lee, 13 P.3d at 1173.
225
Id. at 1179 (emphasis omitted) (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 80(1)).
226
Id.
227
Id.
223
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had little or no legal knowledge except that which was supplied to
228
him by State Farm’s counsel. When Gillespie was asked to describe
the legal training that State Farm had given him to qualify him to
make the evaluation in question, Gillespie indicated that he could
229
not recall what training he had.
When asked whether there were
any sources that opposing counsel could look to in order to
determine what legal information would have been available to
Gillespie apart from the advice he received from counsel, Gillespie
230
The court found that by
indicated there were no other sources.
asserting the subjective evaluation and understanding of its personnel
about the state of the law on stacking, State Farm had affirmatively
injected the legal knowledge of its claims managers into the litigation
and put the extent, and thus the sources, of that legal knowledge at
231
issue. The court found that “State Farm’s claims managers [could
not] testify that they investigated the state of the law and concluded
and believed they were acting within the law but deny Plaintiffs the
ability to explore the basis for this belief and to determine whether it
232
might have known its actions did not conform to the law.”
State Farm argued that it injected the subjective belief of its
claims personnel into the litigation because the plaintiffs had alleged
233
State Farm not only misinterpreted the law but did so knowingly.
Thus, State Farm argued that the plaintiffs, and not State Farm, had
234
injected the issue of subjective belief into the litigation.
After
acknowledging that it would be difficult for State Farm to meet
plaintiffs’ allegation without affirmatively alleging that it had
235
investigated and evaluated the law, the court stated that State Farm
could have done so simply by denying that it knew it was acting
236
unlawfully and relying on a defense of objective reasonableness.
Plaintiffs would then be forced to prove State Farm knew it was acting
237
unlawfully.
Justice Martone vigorously dissented from the majority’s
holding. The Justice prefaced his dissent by acknowledging and
228

Id. n.5.
Id.
230
Lee, 13 P.3d at 1179 n.5.
231
Id. at 1183.
232
Id. at 1182 (internal quotation marks omitted).
233
Id.
234
Id.
235
Id. at 1183 (describing State Farm’s position as being “between Scylla and
Charybdis”).
236
Lee, 13 P.3d at 1182.
237
Id.
229

2004

ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE & WAIVER

561

agreeing with the majority that the Restatement and the Hearn tests
set forth the appropriate rule when a client impliedly waives the
attorney-client privilege by putting assistance or communication in
238
issue. Having made these concessions, the dissent observed that the
Restatement and Hearn analyses requires the privilege holder and not
the other party to the litigation to affirmatively inject an issue that
implicates privileged communications. The dissent emphasized that
the Restatement approach required that either of two conditions be
met: “[T]he client acted upon the advice of a lawyer or that the advice
239
was otherwise relevant to the legal significance of the client’s conduct.” In
that regard, it did not suffice “that the advice was otherwise relevant
240
to the legal significance of the client’s conduct.”
Rather, the
dissent noted that the Restatement requires the client to “assert that
the advice was otherwise relevant to the legal significance of the
241
client’s conduct.”
In Arizona, a bad-faith claim “requires proof of both objective
242
and subjective unreasonableness on the part of the insurer.”
The
plaintiff, not the privilege holder insurance company, determines
whether to put at issue the subjective reasonableness of defendant’s
243
conduct.
In fact, “the plaintiff must inject the issue of subjective
244
unreasonableness into the litigation.” This is so because under the
Noble/Zilisch test for bad faith in Arizona, “[t]he appropriate inquiry
is whether there is sufficient evidence from which reasonable jurors
could conclude that in the investigation, evaluation, and processing
of the claim, the insurer acted unreasonably and either knew or was
245
conscious of the fact that its conduct was unreasonable.”
The dissent
criticized the majority because the majority ruling requires a bad-faith
defendant to choose between defending against both prongs of the
Noble/Zilisch test, and thereby waiving the attorney-client privilege, or
246
defending solely on the objective reasonableness of its decision.
The practical consequence of the majority’s ruling would be that

238

Id. at 1184 (Martone, J., dissenting).
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 80(1)(a)).
240
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
241
Id.
242
Lee, 13 P.3d at 1185 (Martone, J., dissenting) (citing Noble v. Nat’l Am. Life
Ins. Co., 624 P.2d 866, 868 (Ariz. 1981); Zilisch v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 995
P.2d 276, 280 (Ariz. 2000)).
243
Id.
244
Id.
245
Id. (quoting Zilisch, 995 P.2d at 280) (internal quotation marks omitted).
246
Id.
239
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no bad-faith defendant could properly defend the action without
waiving the privilege. In that regard, the majority’s application of
Hearn and the Restatement in the context of the bad-faith case before
it, completely subverted the critical elements of each test.
The dissent observed that “[u]nder the majority view, a plaintiff
may abrogate the defendant’s attorney-client privilege simply by
raising a bad faith claim on any matter regarding an interpretation of
247
the law.” The dissent further observed that “it may well be that an
insurer would be willing to make a coverage decision without relying
on the advice of its lawyers. But the prudent insurer will consult a
lawyer and under today’s decision that advice always will be
248
admissible in an action against it claiming bad faith.”
Justice
247

Id.
Lee, 13 P.3d at 1185 (Martone, J., dissenting). Justice McGregor’s dissent
points to the slippery slope that was created by the majority’s opinion:
But today’s holding, which applies not only to plaintiffs’ bad faith
claim, but also to the counts alleging fraud, will sweep even more
broadly. If a defendant can waive the privilege simply by relying upon
knowledge gained, in part, through advice of counsel to deny a
plaintiff’s allegations, any plaintiff advancing a subjective claim will run
the risk of waiving the privilege simply by filing an action. A plaintiff
who advances a subjective claim seemingly will waive the privilege if,
before asserting his claim, he consults with his lawyer and uses the
knowledge obtained to reasonably evaluate his claim. Because many,
perhaps most, potential litigants do not know the elements of claims
they seek to assert before consulting a lawyer, and do not understand
whether they possess sufficient basis to assert a claim, a plaintiff’s
decision to proceed with an action necessarily relies upon the advice of
counsel. For instance, these plaintiffs presumably consulted with their
attorneys before bringing this action for bad faith, which involves the
subjective element described by the majority. If so, their reliance on
their “subjective and alleged reasonable evaluation of the law—but an
evaluation that necessarily incorporates what the litigant learned from
its lawyer [renders] the communication . . . discoverable and
admissible.” Can the defendant now discover otherwise privileged
communications to determine whether the plaintiffs in fact had a basis
for making their claim? Similarly, a plaintiff in a personal injury action
who claims subjective damages for pain and suffering could be found
to have waived the attorney-client privilege if the knowledge on which
she bases her claim and right to bring it derive, at least in part, from
communications with counsel. If bringing the claim does not itself
waive the privilege, is an assertion from the defendant that the plaintiff
lacked a good faith basis for bringing the claim sufficient to waive the
privilege? And if the defendant’s assertion alone does not waive the
privilege, surely, in the words of the majority opinion, the plaintiff’s
denial of the argument that he lacked a good faith basis for his claims
constitutes an attempt “to establish [his] mental state by asserting that
[he] acted after investigating the law and reaching a well-founded
belief that the law permitted the action [he] took . . . .”
Id. at 1186-87 (McGregor, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
248
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McGregor, who dissented but wrote separately, delivered a eulogy for
the attorney-client privilege because of the majority’s decision:
Today we make the scope of the attorney-client privilege
uncertain, at best, and abrogate the privilege in many instances, at
worst. . . . To permit plaintiffs to discover communications that
they quite probably do not need to establish their claim, we have
placed in jeopardy countless attorney-client communications,
which litigants rightly anticipated would be confidential. We also
have introduced needless uncertainty into the attorney-client
relationship, and have discouraged persons from seeking needed
249
legal advice, which they cannot assume will remain confidential.

3.

Boone v. Vanliner Insurance Co. (Ohio)

The attorney-client privilege has long been recognized by the
250
Ohio courts. In a split decision, however, the Ohio Supreme Court
251
in Boone v. Vanliner Insurance Co. declared that “in an action alleging
bad faith denial of insurance coverage, the insured is entitled to
discover
claims
file
materials
containing
attorney-client
communications related to the issue of coverage that were created
252
prior to the denial of coverage.”
253
The insured, Richard Boone, was an over-the-road truck driver.
He purchased a commercial vehicle liability policy from Vanliner
254
Insurance Company and a second policy was issued to Boone’s
255
256
Both policies provided liability coverage, and both
employer.
257
policies provided underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage.
Boone
was involved in a significant trucking accident in which he suffered
258
The tortfeasor’s insurance company paid Boone
serious injuries.
259
the maximum of its liability policy limits. Because his injuries were
serious, Boone then presented UIM claims to Vanliner under both

249

Id. at 1187 (McGregor, J., dissenting) (paragraph structure omitted).
See, e.g., In re Klemann, 5 N.E.2d 492, 493-94 (Ohio 1936) (explaining that the
attorney-client privilege is intended to encourage full and frank communication
between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in
the observance of law and administration of justice).
251
744 N.E.2d 154 (Ohio 2001).
252
Id. at 158.
253
Id. at 154.
254
Id.
255
Id.
256
Id.
257
Boone, 744 N.E.2d at 154.
258
Id. at 155.
259
Id.
250
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the employer’s and Boone’s individual policies.
Vanliner denied
coverage under the employer’s policy, asserting an exclusion which
261
Vanliner believed precluded UIM coverage for the accident.
Boone filed a declaratory judgment action against Vanliner and
262
included a claim for bad faith.
Boone alleged that the insurer
263
lacked a reasonable justification for denying UIM coverage.
264
Through discovery, Boone sought access to Vanliner’s claims file.
Vanliner initially denied that UIM coverage was available under the
265
After Boone sought discovery of Vanliner’s
employer’s policy.
claims file, Vanliner changed its position and admitted that the
266
employer’s policy provided UIM coverage.
Following this
admission of coverage, Vanliner moved for a protective order
267
regarding numerous privileged documents in its claims file.
The
268
trial court held an in camera inspection of the Vanliner claims file,
and ordered partial disclosure of the privileged documents identified
269
by Vanliner.
270
The Ohio Supreme Court began its analysis in Boone by
271
reviewing its prior decision in Moskovitz v. Mt. Sinai Medical Center.
In Moskovitz, the plaintiffs in a medical malpractice lawsuit sought
prejudgment interest as authorized by Ohio Revised Code §
272
1343.03(C). Under this statutory provision, the prevailing party in
the underlying case had the burden of proving that the opposing
party “failed to make a good faith effort to settle” the case, before
273
prejudgment interest could be awarded.
The Moskovitz court delineated the extent to which a plaintiff
may seek to discover the contents of a malpractice insurance
company’s claim file notwithstanding the insurer’s assertion of work

260

Id.
Id.
262
Id. at 155. Ohio recognizes that an insurance company’s lack of good faith in
processing a claim gives rise to a cause of action in tort against the insurance
company. Hoskins v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 452 N.E.2d 1315 (Ohio 1983).
263
Boone, 744 N.E.2d at 155.
264
Id.
265
Id.
266
Id.
267
Id.
268
Id. at 156.
269
Boone, 744 N.E.2d at 156.
270
Id. at 156-57.
271
635 N.E.2d 331 (Ohio 1994).
272
Id. at 340-41 (referring to OHIO REV. CODE § 1343.03(C)).
273
Id. at 348.
261
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274

product protection and attorney-client privilege.
The court in
Moskovitz found that “[d]ocuments and other things showing the lack
of a good faith effort to settle by a party or the attorneys acting on his
or her behalf are wholly unworthy of the protections afforded by any claimed
275
privilege.”
Having reviewed its prior decision in Moskovitz, the court in
Boone addressed the question of whether claims file materials showing
an insurer’s lack of good faith in determining coverage were equally
276
In reaching its decision that claims file
unworthy of protection.
materials showing lack of good faith in an insurer’s decision to deny
277
coverage are unworthy of protection, the court summarily dismissed
Vanliner’s argument that its holding would discourage insurance
companies from seeking legal advice. The court rejected this
argument “because it assumes that insurers will violate their duty to
conduct a thorough investigation by failing, when necessary, to seek
legal counsel regarding whether an insured’s claim is covered under
the policy of insurance, in order to avoid the insured later having
278
access to such communications, through discovery.”
The court in Boone limited its holding to only attorney-client
communications and work product documents created prior to the
279
denial of coverage. Although the lack of a good faith effort to settle
involves continuing conduct throughout the entire claims process, “a
lack of good faith in determining coverage involves conduct that
280
occurs when assessment of coverage is being considered.”
Three Justices of the Ohio Supreme Court dissented in Boone.
The dissent stated that the “unworthy of protection” rationale
espoused by the majority was unsupported in Moskovitz and is
281
The dissent began its analysis by stating its
unsupported now.
allegiance to the public policy considerations underlying the
attorney-client privilege, namely, the encouragement of “full and
frank communication between attorneys and their clients” to
“promote broader public interests in the observance of law and the
282
administration of justice.”
The dissent observed that there are
274

Id. at 348-52.
Id. at 349 (emphasis added).
276
Boone, 744 N.E.2d at 157.
277
Id.
278
Id.
279
Id. at 158.
280
Id.
281
Id. at 159 (Cook, J., dissenting).
282
Boone, 744 N.E.2d at 160 (Cook, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
275
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already safeguards in place that prevent abuse of the attorney-client
283
privilege.
Particularly, communications in furtherance of a crime
284
or fraud are not deserving of protection. By adopting its “unworthy
of protection” rationale, however, the majority likened
communications in furtherance of civil fraud with an insurance
company’s communications with its attorney before the denial of
285
coverage, without recognizing that a conceptual difference exists
between bad faith and civil fraud. As the dissent noted,
[B]ad faith by an insurer is conceptually different from fraud.
Bad-faith denial of insurance coverage means merely that the
insurer lacked a “reasonable justification” for denying a claim. In
contrast, an actionable claim of fraud requires proof of a false
statement made with intent to mislead. Proof of an insurer’s bad
faith in denying coverage does not require proof of any false or
misleading statements; an insurer could, for example, act in bad
faith by denying coverage without explanation. Because bad faith
is not inherently similar to fraud, there is no reason why an
allegation of bad faith should result in an exception to the
286
attorney-client privilege akin to the crime-fraud exception.

The dissent addressed what it perceived was the “startling”
practical effect of the majority’s holding:
The majority’s holding is also startling for its practical effect.
After today’s decision, an insured need only allege the insurer’s
bad faith in the complaint in order to discover communications
between the insurer and the insurer’s attorney. Not even an
allegation of the crime-fraud exception’s applicability carries such
an absolute entitlement to discovery of attorney-client
communications. In order to overcome the attorney-client
privilege based on the crime-fraud exception, a party must
demonstrate “a factual basis for a showing of probable cause to
believe that a crime or fraud has been committed and that the
communications were in furtherance of the crime or fraud.” The
rule created today requires no similar prima facie showing of bad
faith before an insured is entitled to discover attorney-client
communications of the insurer. The result of the majority’s
decision is a categorical exception to the attorney-client privilege
applicable in any case alleging a bad-faith denial of insurance

283

Id.
Id. Ohio has a well established “crime-fraud exception, which denies the
protection of the privilege when the client communicates with an attorney for the
purpose of committing or continuing a crime or fraud.” State ex rel. Nix v. Cleveland,
700 N.E.2d 12, 16 (Ohio 1998).
285
Boone, 744 N.E.2d at 160 (Cook, J., dissenting).
286
Id. at 160 (citations omitted).
284
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coverage. This is a sweeping exception that a number of courts
287
have refused to adopt.

Finally, the dissent found that the majority’s holding that
insurance company communications were unworthy of the attorney288
client privilege was inconsistent with the purpose of the privilege.
The dissent stated that
the privilege is designed to encourage open discussion between
attorney and client, so as to promote the observance of the law
and allow an attorney to adequately advise the client. With
today’s decision, the majority declares that an insurer’s
consultation with an attorney prior to a denial of coverage does
not fall within this purpose. The rule laid down today assumes that
an insurer will always have some sinister intent to act in bad faith when it
discusses a coverage decision with its attorney. But the majority
overlooks the fact that an insurance company may consult with
legal counsel to obtain legal advice about a coverage decision.
“[A]n insurance company’s retention of legal counsel to interpret
the policy, investigate the details surrounding the damage, and to
determine whether the insurance company is bound for all or
some of the damage, is a ‘classic example of a client seeking legal
advice from an attorney.’” These types of communications
further the purpose of the attorney-client privilege and should be
protected in the same manner as a communication by any other
289
client seeking legal advice from an attorney.

Insurance companies, the dissent wrote, “should be free to seek legal
advice in cases where coverage is unclear without fearing that the
communications necessary to obtain that advice will later become

287

Id. at 160-61 (citation omitted). Courts have routinely refused to adopt a per se
rule of waiver based on mere allegations of bad faith. See, e.g., Dion v. Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co., 185 F.R.D. 288, 294 (D. Mont. 1998) (applying Montana law); Ferrara
& DiMercurio, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 173 F.R.D. 7, 11 (D. Mass. 1997)
(applying Massachusetts law); Dixie Mill Supply Co., Inc. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 168
F.R.D. 554, 558 (E.D. La. 1996) (applying Louisiana law); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v.
S.F. Superior Court, 200 Cal. Rptr. 471, 477 (Ct. App. 1984) (explaining that when
that insurer’s “state of mind” is at issue in a bad-faith action, this does not justify an
exception to the privilege); Tackett v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 653 A.2d 254,
259-260 (Del. 1995) (declining to create a “per se waiver” of privilege in bad-faith
cases); Hartford Fin. Serv. Group, Inc. v. Lake County Park & Recreation Bd., 717
N.E.2d 1232, 1235-36 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (relying on Aetna to reject exception to
privilege in bad-faith cases); see also Md. Am. Gen. Ins. Co. v. Blackmon, 639 S.W.2d
455, 458 (Tex. 1982) (“[I]f a plaintiff attempting to prove the validity of a claim
against an insurer could obtain the insurer’s investigative files merely by alleging the
insurer acted in bad faith, all insurance claims would contain such allegations.”).
288
Boone, 744 N.E.2d at 161 (Cook, J., dissenting).
289
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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290

available” to a dissatisfied insured.
The majority’s holding would
291
have a chilling effect on an insurance company seeking legal advice.
The uninhibited flow of information between the insurance company
292
and its attorney facilitates the accurate assessment of coverage.
IV. CONCLUSION
An insurance company should not lose the protection of the
attorney-client privilege simply because its litigation opponent raises
an issue to which advice of counsel may be relevant. Implied waiver
can only occur when the privilege holder affirmatively injects advice
of counsel into the litigation. If the privilege holder does not use
advice of counsel as a sword, there is no basis for stripping him or her
of its shield. For this reason, courts throughout the country have
consistently held that an insurer’s mere denial of a bad-faith
293
allegation is not sufficient to waive the attorney-client privilege.
Even when a Hearn-type “issue” analysis is applied, more than a mere
denial has been required to waive the privilege in the context of
insurance bad faith. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has
determined that “[t]o waive the attorney-client privilege by
voluntarily injecting an issue in the case, a defendant must do more
than merely deny a plaintiff’s allegations. The holder must inject a
294
new factual or legal issue into the case.”
Merely offering “a new
form of evidence to counter an issue injected by the plaintiffs,” such
295
as bad faith, does not waive the privilege. The proposition that an
insurance company affirmatively argues its good faith ignores the
principle that good faith in the insurance context is merely the
290

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. S.F.
Superior Court, 200 Cal. Rptr. 471, 475 (Ct. App. 1984); State ex rel. U.S. Fid. & Guar.
Co. v. Mont. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 783 P.2d 911, 916 (Mont. 1989)).
291
Id.
292
Id.
293
See, e.g., Chi. Meat Processors, Inc. v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., No. 95 C 4277, 1996
WL 172148, at *11-*12 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 10, 1996) (rejecting argument that insurance
company waived attorney-client privilege on grounds that insurance company did
“not raise[] as an affirmative defense reliance on counsel in support of its defense to
the [bad] faith claim,” but instead “simply denied [insured’s] allegations of bad faith
[which] is insufficient to waive the privilege”); Barr Marine Prods. Co. v. BorgWarner Corp., 84 F.R.D. 631, 635 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (holding that privilege is not
waived merely by defending a suit, but by “rais[ing] as a defense that which
transpired between client and counsel, or reliance on advice of counsel, or questions
counsel’s authority”).
294
Lorenz v. Valley Forge Ins. Co., 815 F.2d 1095, 1098 (7th Cir. 1987).
295
Id. (reversing lower court’s holding that insurer had waived the privilege by
arguing that it acted in good faith during settlement negotiations, where insurer had
merely denied and refuted allegation of bad-faith failure to settle).
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absence of bad faith. Indeed, as a technical matter, a “bad faith”
claim is an allegation that the insurer has breached its implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Plaintiffs will typically raise
an insurance company’s good faith, or lack thereof, in their
complaint, and the insurance company should not waive its privilege
296
by denying those allegations.
Insureds could simply induce an automatic waiver by accusing an
insurance company of bad faith. A claim that an insurance
company’s “state of mind” is at issue, would lead to a demand to
examine privileged materials as a matter of “fairness,” on the theory
that advice of counsel must have contributed to the insurer’s state of
mind. The California Court of Appeals convincingly demonstrated
297
the flaws of this logic in Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Superior Court.
In that case, Aetna brought a declaratory judgment action to
determine coverage, and its insured counter-claimed, accusing Aetna
298
of bad-faith denial of benefits. Although the trial court ruled that
the insured could discover communications between Aetna and
outside coverage counsel, the California Court of Appeals issued a
299
preemptory writ of mandamus overturning that ruling.
The
appellate court found that Aetna did not implicitly waive the privilege
by effectively relying upon advice of counsel as a basis for its actions.
The court continued:
‘Aetna is not saying that their conduct was reasonable because their
counsel opined so, but rather that their conduct was reasonable
because the facts indicated that no valid claim existed.’ . . . Stated
differently, Aetna claims it acted as it did not because it was
advised to do so, but because the advice was, in its view, correct;
and it is prepared to defend itself on the basis of that asserted
correctness rather than the mere fact of the advice. Such a
300
defense does not waive the attorney-client privilege.

The Aetna court also rejected the insured’s argument that Aetna
lost its privilege because the insured’s bad-faith claim had put Aetna’s
“state of mind” at issue. The court held that argument to be
296

See Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int’l Union v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 748 P.2d
283, 290 (Wyo. 1987) (holding that where plaintiffs in defamation action alleged that
defendants acted with malice, defendants did not waive privilege by asserting their
lack of knowledge as a defense: “When, as in this case, malice is an element of a libel
action, the burden of pleading and proving that element rests on the plaintiff.
Consequently, malice became an issue in this case when appellants filed their
complaint.”) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 821 (1988).
297
200 Cal. Rptr. 471 (Ct. App. 1984).
298
Id. at 472.
299
Id. at 478.
300
Id. at 475.
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“palpably untenable” because its adoption would eviscerate the
attorney-client privilege “in a myriad of actions where state of mind is
301
an issue or could easily be made one.” As the court observed, Aetna
had not put its state of mind at issue by seeking declaratory relief;
“[r]ather, it was [the insured] (the party seeking discovery) who put
Aetna’s state of mind at issue by filing a counter claim for bad faith
denial of insurance coverage,” and “[i]f [the insured] could in this
manner waive the privilege on behalf of Aetna . . . bad faith claims
302
would surely proliferate as a new device for obtaining discovery.”
In Tackett, State Farm’s representation that the claim file showed
“routine handling” was questionable. An independent medical
examination was ordered notwithstanding the advice of State Farm’s
outside counsel that the possible benefit of the independent medical
303
examination was “questionable.”
In addition, outside counsel
advised State Farm that the claim had a value at policy limits “or
304
more.”
State Farm proceeded with the IME and also offered sixty
percent of the claim value as assessed by State Farm’s outside counsel.
This type of “routine” claims handling was relevant to the bad-faith
claim when considered in conjunction with State Farm’s “get tough”
policy, and the potential bad-faith pattern and practice it
demonstrated. The court’s in camera examination revealed State
Farm’s questionable conduct. These relevant facts, however, came to
light after the in camera examination.
Before the in camera
305
examination, the only “particularized fact[]” asserted by State Farm
306
was the assertion that the claim file was “handled routinely.”
This
was a general conclusory assertion that exists in most insurance badfaith cases. The “particularized facts” the Tackett court found to
support waiver were found as a result of the in camera claims file
review. The court then appears to use those findings of relevant
evidence to retroactively support waiver. Although the concept of
waiver is not particularly novel, the Tackett court’s low threshold for in
camera review is. By using an in camera examination of documents,
the court puts itself in the position of using its judicial powers to find

301

Id. at 476-77.
Id. at 477; see also Palmer v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 861 P.2d 895, 907 (Mont. 1993)
(holding that although insurer’s expert witness testified that advice of counsel
influenced the insurer’s decision to deny coverage, such testimony did not waive the
privilege where insurer did not rely directly on advice of counsel as a defense to badfaith allegations).
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Tackett v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 653 A.2d 254, 257 (Del. 1995).
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Id.
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Id. at 260.
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Id. at 258.
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relevant information for the plaintiff. Under the Tackett approach,
therefore, the court assumes the principal role of lead investigator.
The Tackett approach results in a judicial hunt for rejection of
advice of counsel which potentially makes deviation from advice of
counsel per se discoverable. Each time the court finds that the
insurance company sought the advice of counsel and then rejected
that advice, the rejection would be per se relevant and therefore
discoverable. The court does not give any guidance as to what degree
of deviation from counsel’s advice falls within per se discoverability.
This approach will have a chilling effect if an insurance company is
compelled to follow the advice of counsel merely in order to preserve
the attorney-client privilege, and this approach ignores the fact that
“advice” is not synonymous with “rigid command.”
A similar role was assumed by the court in Vanliner. There, the
court utilized a procedure in which plaintiff was entitled to an in
camera review of the insurance company’s claim file. If, during the in
camera inspection, the court determines that the file contains
evidence of the insurance company’s lack of good faith, that
information is discoverable notwithstanding the fact that it may come
in the form of attorney-client privileged communications. According
to the Vanliner court, any attorney-client communications showing a
lack of good faith are unworthy of protection through any form of
privilege. The court implicitly adopted a per se rule of discoverability
by analogizing insurance bad-faith cases to fraud. The Ohio courts
have a crime or fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege. By
making insurance bad-faith claims synonymous with fraud, the court
has rendered discoverable attorney-client privileged communications
upon the mere allegation of bad faith without a supporting analytic
framework.
A preliminary determination should be made as to whether
fraudulent conduct on the part of the insurance company has
occurred and whether such conduct was sufficient to overcome the
privilege before permitting discovery of attorney-client privileged
communications. A factual showing adequate to support a good faith
belief by a reasonable person that wrongful conduct of a sufficient
magnitude has taken place should be a preliminary trial court
determination. Upon this determination, the court should then
subject the claims file to an in camera inspection to determine
whether there is a “foundation in fact” to overcome the privilege
based upon an allegation of fraud. This approach is different than
that used by the Delaware court in Tackett and the Ohio court in
Vanliner. In Tackett and Vanliner, the courts invoked the in camera
examination process upon mere allegation or minimal showing of
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misconduct.
Under this approach, to assess the question of
discoverability, a court then injects itself into the attorney-client
relationship between the insurance company and its outside counsel.
Discoverability is not based upon the concept of necessity. Nor is
discoverability based on an opponent’s true need to have access to
privileged material in order to rebut direct assertions made by the
insurance company in the course of litigation. Rather, discoverability
is based upon the concept of relevancy. In Lee, the Arizona court
held that fairness of the judicial process requires implied waiver
whenever the insurance company “claims its conduct was proper and
permitted by law and based in whole or in part on its evaluation of
307
the state of the law.” A pointed dissent in Lee delivered a eulogy for
attorney-client privilege in Arizona, in insurance bad-faith cases, as a
result of the majority’s decision. In essence, the dissent observed that
a plaintiff may abrogate the insurance company’s attorney-client
privilege simply by raising a bad-faith claim on any matter regarding
an interpretation of the law.
The decisions in Tackett, Lee, and Vanliner have introduced
uncertainty into the attorney-client relationship in insurance badfaith cases, and discourage insurance companies from seeking
needed legal advice because they cannot assume the advice will
remain confidential. These decisions have imposed a separate
standard for waiver in the insurance bad-faith context than currently
exists in other more generalized civil matters outside of the insurance
context. The chilling effect of these decisions can only be predicted
on a theoretical basis: one can predict that the expansion of implied
waiver reflected by these decisions will have an adverse effect upon
the attorney-client relationship between insurance companies and
their outside counsel. Certainly there is a chill in the air in Delaware,
Arizona, and Ohio. The question remains as to whether winter will
be coming to the American insurance landscape.
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